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COPYRIGHT AS A RULE OF EVIDENCE
Douglas Lichtman*
Many copyright doctrines serve to exclude from the copyright regime cases particularly prone to
evidentiary complexity. The implicit logic is that for these cases the social costs of litigation
would likely outweigh the social benefits derived from offering copyright protection in the first
place. Doctrines that serve this evidentiary function include some doctrines where an evidentiary
purpose is readily apparent, for example the requirement that eligible works be fixed in tangible
form, and some where the link is quite subtle, for example the rule against protecting work that
lacks creativity. Understanding these doctrines in this light helps to refine their proper scope and
application. It also makes clear a problem facing copyright law more generally: the increasing
divergence between the logical justifications for various copyright doctrines and their actual use
by courts and commentators.

I teach an introductory copyright course at the University of Chicago, and in that
course I find myself repeatedly talking about evidence. I talk about the obvious
evidentiary topics, for example the elements required to establish a prima facie case of
infringement and the various limitations on the use of expert testimony. But I also talk
about evidence in many settings where evidentiary issues might not readily come to
mind.
For instance, it is now well accepted that a work of authorship must show at least a
modicum of creativity in order to qualify for copyright protection.1 Students typically
find this requirement intuitive. Novels, plays, and musical compositions are at the core of
copyright, after all, so naturally some bit of creativity is required. I nevertheless ask my
students to defend creativity as a legal, as opposed to artistic, threshold—in essence,
asking them to explain why a well-designed copyright regime would exclude works that
lack creative spark. That conversation inevitably leads toward a discussion of evidence.
Of course, no one starts there. The first responses typically come from students who
argue that copyright favors creative work because uncreative work is not valuable to
society. Obviously copyright excludes run-of-the-mill expression, these students tell me;
why incur the costs of administering a complex legal regime with respect to worthless
work? The class usually accepts this argument for a few minutes, but then someone offers
an example of an uncreative yet valuable work and the argument begins to unravel. The
phone book lacks creative spirit, but telephone listings certainly serve an important
function in society. In fact, a creatively organized phone book—say, one organized by the
named party’s height—would likely be less valuable than a traditional, alphabetical one.
Databases similarly are often uncreative but valuable. The Kelly Blue Book greatly assists
purchasers of used cars by gathering information about the market value of various
*
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vehicles, but it is definitely not the kind of book that makes for interesting bedtime
reading. The American Bone Marrow Donor Registry similarly lacks imagination but
nonetheless performs a valuable service.
Rejecting the idea that creativity is a filter for social value, the class traditionally
turns next to an argument about costs. Maybe the reason why copyright excludes
uncreative work is that uncreative work is inexpensive to create. There is no point in
incurring the costs of the copyright regime with respect to works that are cheap to create,
the class tells me this time; even without protection, firms and individuals would still find
it worthwhile to produce inexpensive work. This argument falls more quickly than the
first, mainly because the same examples that debunked the social value theory serve to
undermine the cost theory as well. There are significant up-front costs associated with
compiling new phone books and researching new databases. Thus, while it is true that
uncreative expression is sometimes cheap to produce, that is not true across the board,
and, overall, there is no reason to think that creativity is a particularly good proxy for
production costs. Uncreative work can be expensive (think databases) and creative work
can be cheap to produce (think romance novels).
The arguments from here get more sophisticated. For example, sometimes students
suggest that copyright excludes uncreative work as a way of encouraging authors to focus
on creative work. Increasing the reward for uncreative work might distract authors,
causing them to spend more time developing dictionaries and databases and less time
writing Moby Dick and Canterbury Tales. This distraction argument does have appeal in
certain instances, but, like the previous arguments, this one seems too narrow to justify a
broad rule against uncreative work. For starters, it is hard to imagine that Mark Twain
was torn between working on the phone book or penning American classics. A change in
the legal regime might affect the decisions made by investors, publishers, and similar
business entities, then, but it would probably not much impact the decisions made by
authors themselves. Framed that way, of course, the argument is not particularly strong.
If legal rules were to change so as to make any business less attractive—from cattle
ranching to, yes, database production—that would, at the margin, slightly increase the
allure associated with investments in creative expression. Yet surely no one argues
against federal farm subsidies on grounds that a more precarious cattle industry would
lead to better Hollywood scripts. Just the same, while the argument is a little stronger as
applied to database production, it does not seem all that compelling unless (again)
uncreative expression either is of extremely low social value or is extremely inexpensive
to produce.2
Note that, during the conversation in which all of these hypotheses are in turn
brought forward and rejected, my class is inevitably forced to confront the fact that
creativity is a hopelessly subjective standard. In making the above arguments, students
naturally offer what they believe to be no-brainer examples of uncreative work. Yet, in
every case, at least someone in the room disagrees with the example as offered. Is Piet
Mondrian’s painting Composition with Yellow Patch really a work of creative art, or is it
just a few ordinary squares painted in black with one small patch of yellow? Can
Campbell’s Soup cans ever be anything more than boring cupboard material? As Justice
Holmes said in an earlier era, it is “a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only [in]
2
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the law to constitute themselves judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of
the narrowest and most obvious limits.”3
But then I point the class back to an explanation tied to something judges are quite
competent to evaluate: evidence. My argument is simple. If the copyright system were to
recognize rights in uncreative work, courts would be overwhelmed by difficult
evidentiary disputes. Two parties would come forward with remarkably similar works of
authorship, and the court would find it virtually impossible to determine whether one
copied from the other (impermissible infringement) or whether instead any similarity
between the works was just a natural outgrowth of the fact that both works lack
creativity. Ask four college students to create a directory of Asian restaurants in Chicago
and, whether they copy or no, the four will likely produce markedly similar directories. A
creativity requirement, then, empowers courts to exclude from the copyright system a
particularly messy class of cases: cases where courts would not be able to use similarity
as the basis for even a weak inference regarding the likelihood of impermissible copying.
The above argument applies specifically to copyright’s creativity requirement. As I
unfold more fully below, however, similar evidentiary concerns help to explain many of
copyright law’s central doctrines. Why does federal law require that a work be fixed in
some stable form before protection will begin?4 Or deny protection in cases where there
are only a limited number of ways to express a given idea?5 Or deny protection to
descriptive details that flow naturally from a given plot element?6 There are many
reasons, it turns out, but a principal one is that each of these doctrines helps to mitigate
what would otherwise be a difficult problem with respect to proof. In short, copyright law
is in part a rule of evidence. Many copyright doctrines serve to exclude from the
copyright regime cases where evidentiary issues would so increase the costs of litigation
that those costs would likely outweigh the social benefits derived from offering copyright
protection in the first place.
I proceed as follows. Part I continues the discussion begun in this Introduction and
thus considers the combined constitutional and statutory requirement that a work be
original. This is one of the two main prerequisites to federal copyright protection, and it
is today interpreted to mean not only that the work was not copied from another source,
but also that the work demonstrates at least a modicum of creativity. I argue that
requiring creativity makes sense in part because of evidentiary concerns. That is, a
sensible copyright system would distinguish between creative and uncreative work, and
one reason it would do so is because that distinction helps to identify and exclude cases
that would otherwise present extreme problems of proof.
Part II turns attention to the second of the two main prerequisites for federal
copyright protection: the requirement that a work be fixed in a tangible medium of
expression. Under current law, a work qualifies for protection only after it has been
captured in some stable form, such as a typewritten manuscript, a video or audio tape, or
even sufficiently detailed handwritten notes. There are many possible justifications for
this requirement. For instance, its purpose might be to encourage the dissemination of
creative work, the intuition being that something captured in physical form can be passed
3
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more easily from person to person, place to place, and generation to generation. I argue,
however, that the evidence theory offers a better explanation: extending protection to
include unfixed expression—say, oral remarks—would pose extraordinary difficulties
with respect to proof. In making this argument, I explain where other justifications fall
short and I identify some possible reforms that would help the fixation requirement to
better serve an evidentiary purpose.
Part III offers a brief survey of other copyright doctrines on which the evidence
theory sheds light. In particular, I consider the merger doctrine, the doctrine of scènes à
faire, and the federal registration procedure. Finally, Part IV concludes, using the
preceding analysis to expose a larger problem facing the copyright regime, namely that
copyright doctrines are today often used in ways largely unrelated to their logical
justifications.
I. The Creativity Requirement
In copyright, works that demonstrate a modicum of creativity are eligible for
protection, but works that lack creativity are not. Works typically denied protection due
to a lack of creativity include phone books,7 food recipes,8 databases,9 and computer
protocols.10 The question I address in this section is whether these sorts of exclusions are
justified. That is, I ask whether there is any good reason for federal copyright law to
distinguish creative from uncreative work.
The section proceeds in four parts. The first traces the origins of the creativity
requirement. As I explain, it is today widely accepted that creativity is a constitutional
requirement, although that interpretation did not take hold until the 1991 Supreme Court
decision in Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service Company.11 The second
subsection considers standard explanations of, and justifications for, this line between
creative and uncreative work. For example, some previous commentators have argued
that creative work should be favored because it is more valuable to society, while others
have argued that uncreative work should be disfavored because it is inexpensive to
produce. The third subsection articulates the evidence theory and analyzes several
criticisms thereof. A handful of courts have indicated that evidentiary concerns drive the
distinction between the creative and the uncreative. Those opinions have been sharply—
and I argue unfairly—criticized by copyright commentators. Finally, the fourth
subsection concludes with implications, focusing in particular on cases where the modern
creativity requirement is used to deny protection even though there is no reason to do so
on evidentiary grounds.

7

See, e.g., Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Haines & Co., Inc., 932 F.2d 610 (7th Cir. 1991); BellSouth
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A. Foundations
Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution recognizes in
Congress the power to “promote the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times, to Authors and Inventors, the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.”12 The clause is today interpreted to authorize both copyright
and patent law, with “authors” and “writings” referring to copyright and “inventors” and
“discoveries” referring to patent. Congress has frequently invoked this power to
promulgate federal copyright statutes. The current one is the Copyright Act of 1976,13
although that statute has been significantly amended in the years since 1976, in particular
in 1989 by the Berne Convention Implementation Act14 and in 1998 by both the Sonny
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act15 and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.16
Nowhere in all this statutory and constitutional language does there appear any explicit
reference to creativity, however. The closest language is in section 102(a) of the 1976
Act, which states that only “original works of authorship” are eligible for protection.17
That phrase was left undefined in the 1976 Act, however, and the legislative history
suggests that it was “intended to incorporate without change the standard of originality”
that had been previously developed by the courts.18
Just what was this previously developed standard? Unfortunately, courts had not
really developed a clear standard at the time of the 1976 Act. In fact, all that was clear
back then was that an eligible work had to (at a minimum) derive in some way from the
would-be copyright claimant. A work slavishly copied from another source was not
eligible for protection. Copyright was reserved only for “originator[s]” and “maker[s]”;
“he to whom anything owes its origin.”19 This was an originality requirement not in the
sense of requiring “freshness of aspect, design, or style,”20 but rather in the more literal
sense of requiring that the work at issue originate with the author in question. Originality
of this sort was a foundational principle. As the Second Circuit stated in 1976, “the one
pervading . . . prerequisite to copyright protection . . . is the requirement of originality—
that the work be the original product of the claimant.”21
Beyond this one aspect, however, the originality standard as of 1976 was murky at
best. The trouble came in articulating what it meant to say that a work originated with a
particular author. No expression is completely the independent work of its author; every
12

United States Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 8, Cl. 8.
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 101, 90 Stat. 2541, 2542 (1976).
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The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Act of Oct. 27, 1998, Pub. L. No. 298, 105th Cong.,
2d Sess., 112 Stat. 2827 (increasing copyright duration).
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The Digital Millenium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (among other
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against defeating encryption and other copyright management technologies).
17
17 U.S.C. §102(a).
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H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 138, at 51 (1976) [hereinafter “House Rep.”].
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Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
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author to some degree builds on the work of those who have come before. Thus courts
had to further define originality in such a way as to distinguish permissible from
impermissible evolution. Was it enough if an author made significant contributions of
time, skill, or expense? Did originality presuppose a minimum level of artistic
achievement or creative effort? These questions were not easily resolved, and it was in
the struggle to answer them that courts first began to distinguish uncreative works from
works that exhibited some degree of imagination, vision, or spark.
One of the earliest and most influential opinions on point was the Supreme Court
opinion in the Trade-Mark Cases.22 The opinion was a consolidated response to several
appeals, all asking that specific trademark violations be excused on grounds that federal
trademark law was beyond Congress’ constitutional powers. In analyzing the case, one of
the arguments the Court had to address was the government’s contention that the
constitutional language authorizing copyright law could be read to authorize trademark
law as well. The Court rejected this argument.23
The relevant analysis is only a paragraph in length and it contains no citations to any
history, document, or lower court decision. The thrust of the passage is that there are
important distinctions to be drawn between constitutionally-protected “writings” on the
one hand and mere trademarks on the other. Writings, the Court explains, are “founded in
the creative powers of the mind” and are the “fruits of intellectual labor.”24 Trademarks
are “often the result of accident rather than design” and can be “something already in
existence.”25 A writing results from “novelty, invention, discovery, or any work of the
brain.”26 A trademark, by contrast, requires “no fancy or imagination, no genius, no
laborious thought,” just the use of a word or symbol in commerce.27
What all this meant for copyright’s creativity requirement was unclear. In some
sentences, the Court seemed to be saying nothing more than what other courts had said
and would continue to say about “authorship”: copyright requires, at a minimum, that a
would-be author make a non-trivial contribution to the work at issue. This was the
difference between writings and trademarks; writings had to be the work of their authors,
but trademarks could be plucked from existing words and symbols. In other sentences,
however, the Court seemed to require something more, distinguishing trademarks on the
ground that they lack “imagination” and “genius” and thus seemingly implying that
copyright-eligible works must demonstrate these qualities. If this was what the Court had
in mind, note that these extra requirements were being tied to the constitutional word
“writings” and not either to the constitutional word “authors” or to any language from the
copyright statute in effect at the time of the case.
The Supreme Court revisited these issues a few years later in Burrow-Giles
Lithographic v. Sarony.28 At issue was a photograph of the playwright Oscar Wilde. The
photographer had posed Wilde, adjusted the background lighting, chosen Wilde’s

22

100 U.S. 82 (1879).
Id. at 82.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
111 U.S. 53 (1884).
23
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wardrobe, and ultimately operated the camera that captured Wilde’s image.29
Defendant—in court because he had made an unauthorized lithograph based on the
photo—argued that these many activities did not amount to authorship for constitutional
purposes:
[A] photograph is the mere mechanical reproduction of the physical features or
outlines of some object animate or inanimate, and involves no originality of thought,
or any novelty in the intellectual operation connected with its visible reproduction in
shape of a picture.30

The implication was that photographers were not authors, and Congress therefore did not
have the constitutional authority to protect photographs.31
As a technical matter, the Burrow-Giles Court did not address this argument. The
photograph of Wilde was not some mechanical rendering completely devoid of
“originality of thought” or “novelty in the intellectual operation.” Quite the opposite, the
trial court had found as a matter of fact that the photograph was “useful, new, harmonious
. . . and that [] plaintiff made the same . . . entirely from his own original mental
conception.”32 Some photographs might lack these indicia of originality, and those would
pose a more difficult question. But that was not the case before the Court, and the Court
therefore refused to speak to the issue. “On the question as thus stated we decide
nothing,” wrote Mr. Justice Miller for a unanimous Court, refusing to answer the
hypothetical question of what would have happened had the photograph been a “mere
mechanical reproduction.”33
In dicta, however, the Burrow-Giles Court expressed doubt that any fair
interpretation of the constitutional language could make creativity or artistic
accomplishment a prerequisite to copyright protection. As the Court pointed out, the first
Congress of the United States, “sitting immediately after the formation of the
Constitution,” had passed a copyright act that explicitly included within its purview maps
and charts as well as books.34 By any definition, these were works of negligible
creativity, yet in 1790 they were deemed eligible for copyright by Congress. “The
construction placed upon the Constitution . . . by the men who were contemporary with
its formation, many of whom were members of the convention which framed it, is of
itself entitled to very great weight.”35
In 1903, the Supreme Court again spoke on the issue of what an author had to
contribute in order to produce work eligible for copyright protection, this time in the case
29

Id. at 55.
Id. at 59.
31
Defendant also argued that a photograph could not be a “writing” for constitutional purposes; that
term was supposedly limited to include only items such as books and pamphlets that are literally written by
an author. Id. at 57. The Court rejected this argument, stating that the term should be read broadly and
noting, further, that photographs did not even exist at the time the constitutional language was written. Id.
at 58.
32
Id. at 54 (discussing, but not formally citing, trial court findings).
33
Id. at 59.
34
Id. at 56. The word “charts” likely referred to navigational charts, the creation of which was
obviously a priority during the early years of the nation’s development.
35
Id. at 57. Jane Ginsburg offers a rich account of this history and its implications in her article, Jane
Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information, 90 Colum. L.
Rev. 1865 (1990).
30
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of Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Company.36 Plaintiff had produced a series of
lithographs representing images from the circus.37 There was some dispute as to how
similar the images were to the various real-life circus acts depicted, but, importantly, the
Court held that this detail was not relevant to the issue of copyright eligibility. “Even if
[the lithographs] had been drawn from the life,” wrote the majority, the resulting images
would still be the “personal reaction” of the individual who created them and, as such,
eligible for protection.38 As the Court explained:
Personality always contains something unique. It expresses its singularity even in
handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is
one man’s alone. That something he may copyright unless there is a restriction in the
words of the [federal statute.]39

Thus, while the Trade-Mark Cases and many lower court opinions had seemed to flirt
with the idea that the Constitution requires more than mere origination—“fancy,”40
“imagination,”41 “genius,”42 “laborious thought”43—in Bleistein, as in the dicta of
Burrow-Giles, the Supreme Court seemed ready to accept almost any authorial
contribution as sufficient.
Lower courts over the next many years understandably wavered between requiring
creativity and suggesting that any non-trivial contribution could suffice. Consider, for
example, two prominent and contemporaneous Second Circuit decisions: Chamberlin v.
Uris Sales Corp.44 and Alfred Bell & Company v. Catalda Fine Arts.45 In Chamberlin, the
Second Circuit evaluated a game board similar to that used for the game backgammon.
The court focused on creativity, explicitly stating that “the Constitution does not
authorize [copyright] to one whose product lacks all creative originality.”46 The opinion
was light in terms of its detail or reasoning, but it did seem to follow the language of the
Trade-Mark Cases rather than the looser requirements articulated in Burrow-Giles and
Bleistein.
Just six years later, however, the Second Circuit changed course. The new case was
Alfred Bell, and at issue were a set of engravings designed to mimic several preexisting
oil paintings.47 The engravings had been carved with great skill and meticulous care, but
their basic purpose and effect was simply to reproduce the original images. The question
was whether, on balance, this was adequate originality for copyright purposes. The
Second Circuit held that it was:
All that is needed to satisfy both the Constitution and the statute is that the ‘author’
contributed something more than a ‘merely trivial’ variation, something
36

188 U.S. 239 (1903).
Id. at 248.
38
Id. at 249-50.
39
Id. at 250.
40
100 U.S. at 82.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
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150 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1945).
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191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
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150 F.2d at 513.
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191 F.2d at 99.
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recognizably his own. Originality in this context means little more than a prohibition
of actual copying.48

The Second Circuit went on to say that the aforementioned more-than-trivial
variation could be completely accidental. Bad eyesight or “a shock caused by a clap of
thunder” could yield authorship in the constitutional sense, despite the obvious lack of
any intentional mental process.49 The contrast between Chamberlin and Alfred Bell was
thus dramatic. In Chamberlin, it was “obvious” to the Second Circuit that the
“Constitution does not authorize such a monopoly grant to one whose product lacks all
creative originality.”50 A scant six years later, copyright was available no “matter how
poor artistically the ‘author’s’ addition,” so long as “it be his own.”51
Outside the Second Circuit, things were not any clearer, as courts throughout the
country struggled to articulate what it was that the Constitution implicitly required. One
popular approach was to deem the constitutional demand satisfied by significant effort—
“sweat of the brow”—even in the absence of other touchstones. In Toksvig v. Bruce
Publishing, Inc.,52 for example, the plaintiff had invested considerable effort researching
a biography of Hans Christian Anderson; there were flights to Denmark, interviews with
people who knew Andersen at various stages of life, translations of information from
Danish to English, and so on.53 After the biography came out, another author decided to
write a biography of Andersen as well. But instead of researching Andersen herself or
negotiating a license with the first author, the second author just took what she needed
from the earlier work and used it as her own.54 This, to the Toksvig Court, was copyright
infringement.55 Plaintiff’s significant efforts gave him rights in his resulting research.
Another biographer could re-discover those facts or strike a bargain with the original
biographer, but blatant unauthorized copying was not to be permitted.
Not all courts thought labor sufficient to meet the constitutional requirement,
however. An influential opinion on this side of the debate was the Fifth Circuit’s opinion
in Miller v. Universal City Studios.56 At issue this time were the facts associated with the
1968 kidnapping of a college-aged girl. Plaintiff had worked with the victim to gather the
facts of her story and had written a book revealing those details. Defendant allegedly
used the book without permission to develop a made-for-television movie. Assuming for
the purposes of appeal that the book did indeed require significant effort in its production,
the Miller Court asked whether significant research efforts alone could make a work
eligible for copyright. The court held that they could not.57
The Miller Court was very careful to note that it was not basing its decision on
policy but was instead following what it thought to be unavoidable limitations inherent in
48

Id. at 102-03.
Id. at 105. Cf. Florabelle Flowers, Inc. v. Joseph Markovits, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 304, 305 (D.C.N.Y.
1968) (“The accidental or laboriously contrived creation, if it qualifies objectively, is doubtless enough.”).
50
150 F.2d at 513.
51
191 F.2d at 103.
52
181 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950).
53
Id. at 666.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 667.
56
Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981).
57
Id. at 1372.
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copyright law.58 Specifically, the court read Burrow-Giles to require that “an ‘author’ is
one ‘to whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker; one who completes a work of
science or literature.’”59 And the Miller Court refused to believe that a fact could
“originate” with a person, even one who put in significant efforts to uncover it. “The
discoverer merely finds and records. He may not claim that the facts are ‘original’ with
him.”60 Note that the panel did seem to understand the possible argument on the other
side. The majority opinion explicitly points out that the court below had focused on “time
and money” as the basis for the plaintiff’s claim.61
Debates about the various metrics for measuring authorship might have continued
indefinitely but for the Supreme Court’s 1991 ruling in Feist Publications v. Rural
Telephone Service Company.62 There, the Supreme Court held that creativity was an
absolute prerequisite to copyright protection.63 Time, effort, and expense were not
enough, nor was skill, nor, presumably, those random variations caused by bad eyesight
or claps of thunder. The necessary element—implicit in the constitutional words
“authors” and “writings”—was creativity.
The facts in Feist were straightforward. Rural was a local telephone company and, in
the course of providing telephone service, it had assigned telephone numbers to its
various subscribers. Rural published that information in the form of two telephone
directories, an alphabetically organized White Pages and a Yellow Pages that was
organized by category. Feist, meanwhile, was not a telephone company but it also
published telephone directories. For one of them, it wanted to list Rural’s customers in
addition to listing telephone customers served by other local firms. Rural refused to
license this use of its directory, however, so Feist sent employees to gather the relevant
information by going door-to-door. Feist ultimately independently confirmed
approximately 3,600 of the 4,935 entries it needed, but it then copied the remaining
entries directly from Rural’s telephone books.64 Rural sued for copyright infringement.65
The Supreme Court rejected Rural’s copyright claim on grounds that what Feist took
was not protected expression. To qualify for protection, the Court explained, a work had
to be original. And original, “as that term is used in copyright, means . . . that the work
was independently created by the author . . . and that it possesses at least some minimal
degree of creativity.”66 The first half of the Court’s definition echoed well-established
doctrine. For two hundred years courts had been saying that under federal law an eligible
work must in some sense derive from the would-be copyright claimant. But, as the
58

Id. at 1369 (“The issue is not whether granting copyright protection to an author's research would be
desirable or beneficial, but whether such protection is intended under the copyright law.”).
59
Id. at 1368 (quoting Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. 53, at 58).
60
Id. at 1368 (quoting 1 M. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright 2.03(E), at 2-34 (1980)).
61
Id. at 1369.
62
499 U.S. 340 (1991).
63
Id. at 345.
64
Id. at 343-44.
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More specifically, Rural presented two related theories. First, Rural argued that it had created each
name/number pair and thus held copyright in each and every listing. Second, Rural argued that it had also
created the White Pages and the Yellow Pages and thus had earned protection for each of those
compilations (taken as a whole) above and beyond any rights in the individual entries. Id. at 361-62.
66
Id. at 345.
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discussion above makes clear, the second half of the Court’s definition had previously
been in considerable dispute. The Court ended that dispute with its holding, and it did so
by primarily relying on two of the Supreme Court decisions discussed above: the TradeMark Cases and Burrow-Giles.
The Court read the Trade-Mark Cases to support the proposition that the
constitutional term “writings” includes only such works as “are founded in the creative
powers of the mind” and “are the fruits of intellectual labor.”67 Those are of course
accurate quotes; but in the context of the Trade-Mark Cases, they are subject to two
alternative readings. They can be read to require creativity, or they can be read along with
other passages in the case to require more narrowly that authors make some non-trivial
contribution to the work at issue. Without discussion, the Feist Court adopted the
creativity interpretation—interestingly, adding that only a “minimal degree” of creativity
is necessary, even though the Trade-Mark Cases opinion itself contains no such
qualifying language.
The Feist Court similarly read Burrow-Giles to require creativity, albeit this time
because of the constitutional word “authors.” Feist does not quote any of the contrary
language from Burrow-Giles, for example the passage where the Burrow-Giles Court
explicitly refuses to decide this issue,68 or the discussion where it notes that the first
federal copyright statute had extended protection to (arguably) uncreative works like
maps and charts.69 Instead, Feist simply quotes a passage from Burrow-Giles that
describes copyright as applying to “original intellectual conceptions,”70 and then quotes a
later section where copyright is said to require “intellectual production . . . thought, and
conception.”71 These passages, according to the Feist Court, “emphasize[] the creative
component of originality.”72
With the rule thus established, the Feist Court dutifully searched the telephone
listings for the required creativity.73 Understandably, the Court did not find it. When
considering each telephone entry in isolation, the Court put forward the argument set out
in Miller—the idea that “facts do not owe their origin” to any particular party and thus
cannot satisfy the constitutional language.74 When considering the telephone books each
as a whole, the Court recognized that, in some cases, the selection and arrangement
inherent in a compilation would constitute authorship for constitutional purposes, but
held that the alphabetical listings at issue were not sufficiently creative.75
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Id. at 346 (citing The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879)).
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
69
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
70
499 U.S. at 346 (citing Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58).
71
Id. at 347 (citing Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 59-60).
72
499 U.S. at 346.
73
Id. at 361-62.
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Id. at 347.
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Id. at 362-63. Even if the Court had deemed the phone books sufficiently original, there would still
have been some dispute over whether Rural took those original elements or, instead, merely took the
name/number pairs independent of any original arrangement that Rural might have superimposed.
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B. Rationales
Copyright commentators have long struggled to explain why a sensible copyright
regime would deny protection to uncreative work. One theory is that uncreative work is
not sufficiently valuable to society to warrant the administrative costs associated with
copyright protection. Running a copyright regime is costly. The resources that the
government invests in copyright disputes surely can be used in more productive ways;
and the same is true for the resources invested by private parties. This latter point is
tricky in that private parties voluntarily invest in litigation and so at first blush one might
be tempted to think that their investments must be socially efficient. But that is not
necessarily true. After all, two parties might fight over a $100 bill found on the street, but
for society that effort is pure waste because nothing useful is accomplished in the
struggle—its effects are only distributional. Thus, there is a lot of waste associated with
copyright litigation, and if uncreative works lack value, it might be in society’s interest to
minimize waste by excluding these works from the copyright regime.76
There are two responses to this argument, and both seem to undermine it
significantly. The first is simply to question whether creativity is a good proxy for value.
As the Introduction makes clear, uncreative but valuable works are common. The Kelly
Blue Book and the American Bone Marrow Donor Registry both fit that description, as do
telephone listings and legal databases like Westlaw and Lexis. That said, some
commentators apparently think creativity is a reasonable touchstone. Judge Kaplan, for
example, wrote in his popular copyright monograph that the creativity requirement is
justified because it ensures that an author must “deposit more than a penny” before the
“copyright turnstile” will revolve.77
The second response is that, even if uncreative work does lack value, that is not a
reason to deny it copyright protection because copyright neither encourages the creation
of valueless work nor encourages litigation over it. The insight here is simple: copyright
is not a government-sponsored cash prize; it is instead a legal right that makes it easier
for an author to sell his intellectual wares without falling victim to free-riding rivals.
Were copyright a cash prize, worries about valueless work would make sense. The cash
prize would be an incentive to create this work and then litigate with respect to its
ownership—and that would be a bad deal for society if uncreative work is indeed
valueless. But copyright is not cash and, as such, it does not have this effect. If a work
turns out to lack value, copyright or no, the relevant author will earn only the pittance he
deserves. There is no built-in reward for copyright ownership; value, even for
copyrighted work, is determined by market forces. This market check is particularly
strong for uncreative work because, almost by definition, markets for uncreative work are
vulnerable to entry. If the work is obvious, or if it can be created with just an investment
of time, money, or labor, rivals typically will be able to make those investments and
come up with substitute, competing goods. Even with copyright protection, then, there
would not be much of an incentive to create valueless work, and there would similarly
not be much of an incentive to litigate over its ownership.
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Authors of uncreative work might waste some resources even if their works are denied copyright
protection. For instance, an author denied protection might compensate by using encryption, secrecy, and
other forms of self-help. This type of waste is almost impossible to avoid.
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Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright 46 (1967).
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A related argument sometimes offered in support of the distinction between creative
and uncreative work is that uncreative work tends to be inexpensive to produce and
therefore does not require legal protection. Professors Patterson and Joyce have made this
claim, arguing that “by correlating protection with creativity, [modern law] makes the
rewards of copyright commensurate with the type of effort each author puts forth.”78 This
intuition might also have influenced Copyright Office regulations, one of which provides
that “short phrases” including “slogans” and “mere variations of typographical
ornamentation, lettering or coloring” are not eligible for protection.79
The low-cost rationale is no more satisfying than was the low-value rationale,
however, because uncreative work is not systematically inexpensive. As the “sweat of the
brow” cases make plain, effort itself can come at a hefty price. In fact, a critical similarity
between uncreative and creative work is that both are subject to the public goods problem
routinely associated with information products.80 That is, in both cases the cost to the
author of producing the first embodiment can be high, but the costs to anyone of
producing additional copies based on that first embodiment are often low. The high
startup cost might be an investment in creativity, as is likely the case when an author sets
out to write a new novel or a director attempts to stage a new movie or play, or the high
startup cost might have nothing to do with creativity, as was surely the case when a group
of entrepreneurs first set out to capture electronic versions of all federal opinions ever
published, or a group of doctors first gathered what ultimately became the bone marrow
donor registry’s life-saving data.
Without copyright, all of these aforementioned authors would lose money. They
would incur the relevant first-copy costs only to then see their rivals make and sell
competing copies based on the first. That competition would drive prices down toward
marginal cost, and the initial authors would never be able to earn revenues sufficient to
offset their first-copy costs. This public goods problem is the traditional economic
justification for copyright, and it applies equally well to creative and uncreative work. It
is no wonder, then, that cost-based arguments do not help to justify a distinction between
these two categories. The cost-related arguments turn out to be identical in the two
settings.81
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L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of Copyright Protection for Law
Reports and Statutory Compilations, 36 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 719, 808-09 (1989). Robert Denicola has
similarly argued that creativity is supposed to filter out works where little effort is involved, although
Denicola recognizes that creativity is probably not very good at accomplishing this task. See Robert C.
Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts, 81 Columbia L. Rev. 516, 522 (1981).
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37 C.F.R. 202.1(a).
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Public goods are goods for which one consumer’s consumption does not in any way diminish another
consumer’s ability to consume. Information is a public good, and much of intellectual property law is an
attempt to harness this natural benefit while at the same time ensuring that there are adequate incentives to
create and disseminate information products in the first place. For a general introduction to the logic and
implications of public goods, see Ronald Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J. Law & Econ. 357
(1974).
81
It is of course true that, in both settings, there are certain advantages to being first even without
copyright protection. The first party to put out an information good might enjoy reputation benefits, for
example, or might be able to sell the information product at a high price while rivals gear up to compete.
The point in the text is only that all of these arguments apply with equal force to creative and uncreative
work. Long ago, Justice Breyer famously argued that first-mover advantages might be so substantial that
copyright is unnecessary. See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in
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Another unsatisfying explanation frequently put forward to justify the distinction
between creative and uncreative work simply states that copyright is designed to reward
contributions to culture. Marshall Leaffer seems to adopt this perspective, writing in his
thorough and thoughtful copyright treatise that the creativity requirement is a “quid pro
quo for the copyright monopoly” ensuring that copyright “reward[s] with a copyright
only an author who has contributed to our fund of culture.”82 This argument ultimately
fails on two grounds. First, as a descriptive matter, it is inconsistent with the history of
copyright law—for instance, the fact that the first copyright act explicitly included maps
and charts, two types of work that are routinely uncreative.83 Second, on normative
grounds, the argument fails because it explains nothing about why cultural contributions
should be favored over other authored works. As I have already argued, cultural and
uncreative works both merit protection in that both can be valuable, both can be
expensive to produce, and both are subject to a real free-rider problem. To say that
copyright is meant to focus on culture is to state a conclusion, not to explain why it is
justified.
So what is the justification? Of the traditional explanations, the most compelling is
that copyright excludes uncreative work because the public has a strong interest in
making full use of factual information. This argument most often comes up in cases like
Toksvig where an author is attempting to protect facts that have been discovered through
significant expense. Courts deny protection in these cases on grounds that the public
interest is best served by a legal regime where facts are free for all to use. As one court
asserted, “to grant copyright protection [to uncreative work] would risk putting large
areas of factual research material off limits and threaten the public’s unrestrained access
to information.”84 Another court similarly stated that the “public interest in the free flow
of information is assured by the law's refusal to recognize a valid copyright” in
uncreative work.85 The Supreme Court has also made this sort of argument, asserting that
the “very object of publishing a book on science or the useful arts is to communicate to
the world the useful knowledge which it contains,” but that “this object would be
frustrated if the knowledge could not be used without incurring the guilt of piracy of the
book.”86 Importantly, this was the rationale put forward in Feist, too: “[R]aw facts may
be copied at will. This result is neither unfair nor unfortunate. It is the means by which
copyright advances the progress of science and art.”87
This sort of argument has allure, but it is subject to an important limitation: copyright
simultaneously increases and decreases the amount of information available to the public.
Copyright increases the available information to the extent that it gives authors an added
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 281 (1970). It is unclear whether he was
right back then, and it is unclear how his argument might change given today’s new technologies for
distribution and duplication; but, again, nothing in his argument turns on the distinction between the
creative and the uncreative.
82
Marshall Leaffer, Understanding Copyright Law 58 (3d ed. 1999).
83
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
84
Financial Information v. Moody’s Investment Service, 808 F.2d 204, 207 (2d Cir. 1986).
85
Iowa State University Research Foundation, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., 621 F.2d 57,
61 (2d Cir. 1980) (citations omitted).
86
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1880).
87
499 U.S. at 350.
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incentive to develop and disseminate useful work. Copyright decreases the available
information to the extent that it allows authors to limit the use of information by charging
a price above marginal cost. If a court’s purpose is to increase the free flow of a particular
type of information, then, it is not by any means clear that the best option is to deny
copyright protection to that class of works. Instead, the best option might be to increase
protection and in that way increase the incentive to gather and share it. Everything
depends on which of the two effects dominates, and there is certainly no reason to believe
that the right answer for all or even most types of uncreative work is to deny protection.88
Of course, this is not to say that uncreative work raises exactly the same
incentive/access tradeoff as that raised by creative work. Quite the opposite, one can
easily distinguish uncreative from creative work along this dimension. For example, it is
possible that the public has a stronger need for access to factual rather than fictional
information because important public policy decisions often turn on factual data. On this
argument, former President Ford should be accorded less protection for the facts
presented in his autobiography than Orson Welles receives for the creative elements
inherent in Citizen Kane. Ford’s memoir, after all, reveals important details about
Watergate and the Nixon pardon.89 The opposite point, however, can be made as well,
namely that the public has a weaker need for mandatory access to factual information
than it does for fictional information because in most cases a second author can invest his
own time, money, and energy to independently gather any factual information that might
be of interest. On this argument, it might be harder to create a substitute for Citizen Kane
than it would be to reinvestigate the facts surrounding the crash of the German airship
Hindenburg.90 The point here is simply that, overall, there is no reason to believe that the
incentive/access tradeoff is skewed completely to one side for uncreative work. The
scope of protection should depend in part on the nature of a given work, but the fact that
the public often values factual information certainly does not mean that uncreative work
should be left unprotected as a general rule.
C. The Evidence Theory
Up to this point, I have surveyed a number of possible explanations for, and
justifications of, copyright’s distinction between creative and uncreative work. In
particular, I have discussed the argument that uncreative work is of particularly low
social value and hence not worth protecting; the related argument that uncreative work
tends to be inexpensive to produce and hence, again, is not worth protecting; the
argument that copyright is meant to focus exclusively on cultural contributions; and the
argument that denying protection to uncreative work increases societal welfare by
making important information free for all to use. Only the last of these conventional
explanations turns out to have significant normative appeal, although each offers at least
some insight into why uncreative work might be excluded from the copyright regime.
88

Incentives versus access is a familiar tradeoff in intellectual property law. See, e.g., Rebecca
Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1017, 1024-46 (1989) (sketching this trade-off as applied to patent law).
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Cf. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985)(analyzing a
copyright claim in Nixon’s memoirs and noting that there is a “greater need to disseminate factual works
than works of fiction or fantasy”).
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Cf. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980) (analyzing copyright claim
regarding facts of Hindenburg downing).
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Consider now the evidence theory. The basic logic is straightforward: one reason a
sensible copyright regime would distinguish uncreative from creative work is that
uncreative work introduces extraordinary problems of proof. Were two litigants to step
forward with remarkably similar uncreative works, a court would find it virtually
impossible to determine whether one copied from the other (impermissible infringement)
or whether instead any similarity simply resulted from the fact that both works lack
creativity. As mentioned in the Introduction, if I were to ask four students to create a
directory of Asian restaurants in Chicago, the four would likely produce markedly similar
directories whether they copied or not. An originality requirement, then, empowers courts
to exclude from the copyright system a particularly messy class of cases: cases where
courts would not be able to use similarity as the basis for even a weak inference regarding
the likelihood of impermissible copying.
A few courts have flirted with this sort of explanation for copyright’s creativity
requirement. The first was the Second Circuit in L. Batlin & Son v. Snyder.91 At issue was
a toy bank made in the shape of the legendary patriotic figure, Uncle Sam. Banks of this
sort had long been available to the public, but they were always made out of cast iron,
whereas the one in question was made out of plastic. Plaintiff presented evidence
designed to show that changing from a cast iron to a plastic medium was difficult and
time-consuming; and the lower court ultimately found that “a degree of physical artistic
skill” was indeed necessary for the transformation.92 The question on appeal, then, was
whether a demonstration of this sort of “physical” skill was sufficient for copyright
purposes, or whether artistic accomplishment was the touchstone of authorship.
Surveying prior cases (including Bell, discussed above), the Batlin Court found that
in comparable instances works were awarded protection only when they exhibited more
than “merely trivial variation[s]” from preexisting works.93 Unfortunately, that was not
this case. The plastic bank at issue was extraordinarily similar to the conventional cast
iron version in shape and detail. And while there were some minor differences, the court
found that those were “functional”—that is, they were changes made to accommodate the
use of plastic.94 Thus, to find originality here, the court would have needed to say that
physical skill sufficed even in the absence of non-trivial variations. This the court would
not do: “If there be a point in the copyright law pertaining to reproductions at which sheer
artistic skill and effort can act as a substitute for the requirement of substantial variation,
it was not reached here.”95
The Batlin Court’s rationale can be seen as an early articulation of the evidence
theory:
Absent a genuine difference between the underlying work of art and the copy of it
for which protection is sought, the public interest in promoting progress in the arts—
indeed, the constitutional demand—could hardly be served. To extend
copyrightability to minuscule variations would simply put a weapon for harassment
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in the hands of mischievous copiers intent on appropriating and monopolizing public
domain work.96

The last line of the court’s analysis is a tentative version of the evidence theory. It seems
to say that evidentiary issues would be too complex if courts were to allow copyright in
minuscule variations. Courts would find it difficult to distinguish permissible copying of
the underlying work from impermissible copying of the nearly identical copyrighted
work. That would indeed put “in the hands of mischievous copiers” a dangerous power:
the power to interfere with permissible copying of the unprotected underlying work.97
The most famous and complete articulation of the evidence theory came a few years
after Batlin, specifically in the form of Judge Posner’s opinion in Gracen v. Bradford
Exchange.98 Like Batlin, Gracen concerned the copyright eligibility of a derivative
work—that is, a work based on a preexisting original. This time, the preexisting work
was a copyrighted movie, and the derivative work under consideration was a collectors’
plate featuring a likeness of the film’s lead actress. The question presented was whether
the artist who painted the plate could acquire rights in the likeness and ultimately wield
those rights against a second artist also hired to make a line of collectors’ plates. Writing
for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner worried about evidence:
[A]s applied to derivative works, the concept of originality in copyright law has as
one would expect a legal rather than aesthetic function—to prevent overlapping
claims. Suppose Artist A produces a reproduction of the Mona Lisa, a painting in the
public domain, which differs slightly from the original. B also makes a reproduction
of the Mona Lisa. A, who has copyrighted his derivative work, sues B for
infringement. B’s defense is that he was copying the original, not A’s reproduction.
But if the difference between the original and A’s reproduction is slight, the
difference between A’s and B’s reproductions will also be slight, so that if B had
access to A’s reproductions the trier of fact will be hard-pressed to decide whether B
was [impermissibly] copying A or [permissibly] copying the Mona Lisa itself.99

Interestingly, in Gracen, Posner explicitly limits his articulation of the evidence
theory to apply only to those cases where the work at issue is based on another
copyrighted work: “We are speaking . . . only of the requirement of originality in
derivative works.”100 As Posner himself would later realize, however, the same basic
point applies much more broadly. Consider, for example, Posner’s opinion in Ty, Inc. v.
GMA Accessories.101 One part of that litigation concerned two beanbag stuffed animals,
both described by their firms as stuffed pigs. Posner points out that, if either stuffed pig
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had at all resembled a real pig, the copyright issue would be a difficult one.102 The court
in that instance would have had a hard time determining whether one pig was copied
from the other (impermissible) or whether instead any similarity simply resulted from
both trying to resemble a real pig. Fortunately, in Ty, neither stuffed pig looked remotely
real, and thus the evidence issue turned out to be straightforward.103
Gracen has been subject to a great deal of criticism in the years since the opinion
first issued. Melville and David Nimmer, for example, have questioned how often these
sorts of evidentiary puzzles are likely to occur in practice.104 Was Gracen a fluke for
presenting a case where two derivative works were so similar that it was unclear whether
the relevant authors copied from one another or instead both borrowed from the same
original work? The Nimmers think so. In their words, it is “factually unjustified” to
assume that “any slight ... variation that a given derivative work makes to a particular
underlying work is likely to be similar to any slight variation to the same underlying
work made by a different derivative work author.”105 Whether this criticism sticks is in
the end an empirical question. But the Nimmer argument focuses on the special case of
derivative work, and thus one wonders whether they have accounted for uncreative work
more generally. After all, while fact patterns like that from Gracen might sound farfetched, it seems very reasonable to expect that different authors will routinely produce
nearly identical street maps, recipes, telephone books, and databases.
Peter Jaszi is another prominent critic of Gracen, although his objections seem more
like refinements than significant challenges to the theory. One of his concerns is purely
semantic. In Gracen, Judge Posner held that a derivative work must be “substantially
different from the underlying work” to avoid the evidence quagmire.106 Jaszi worries that
this language, taken out of context, might lead courts to demand too much from
derivative work, and so Jaszi prefers earlier court language requiring only that a
derivative work be “distinguishable” from its predecessor.107 This is a fair point as far as
it goes, but it is certainly not a refutation of Posner’s basic argument.
Another of Jaszi’s objections is that any evidence problem can be solved through the
use of expert testimony.108 This seems to miss the mark on several dimensions. First, it
might not be true that experts can readily determine the lineage of a given work or, more
important, that a finder of fact can evaluate dueling expert claims reliably. Second, even
if experts are helpful, that point is not inconsistent with the evidence theory. The claim,
after all, is that certain categories of copyright cases are so expensive to litigate that
society might be better off excluding them from copyright’s purview. Jaszi helpfully
102
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identifies one culprit for those high costs—experts—and he is right about that. In certain
cases, litigants will find it in their private interest to incur significant litigation expenses,
including the hiring of experts, even though those expenses are socially unjustified. The
creativity requirement works to exclude some of these pricey cases from the system.109
John Wiley is the third copyright authority to criticize Gracen. His concern is with
cases where an author’s purpose is to create a work that accurately mimics an existing
work. On the evidence theory, such a work might be denied protection; to Wiley, this
sounds absurd. As interpreted in Gracen, “the copyright requirement of originality makes
no sense because it claims variation as a virtue, while authors of many objects of
copyright protection rightly regard variation as a vice.”110 In Gracen, for example, the
artist’s purpose in creating the plates was to create an image recognizable to anyone who
saw the movie on which the plates were based. “Yet . . . faithful accuracy doomed
Gracen’s copyright suit,” Wiley complains, “for Judge Posner thought her painting
looked hardly different from the movie.”111
Wiley is correct: evidentiary concerns might lead courts to deny protection to some
works that are intentionally designed to be faithful reproductions. But that is not an
unforeseen consequence. Instead, Wiley points to one type of case where copyright might
rationally deny protection. The justification is not that faithful reproductions are less
valuable to society than other, more distinctive works; nor is it that faithful reproductions
are easier to accomplish or in any other way less meritorious. The justification is simply
that these cases can be quite costly to litigate, and so a sensible copyright regime might
choose to exclude them on grounds that the social costs likely outweigh the social
benefits.112
D. Implications
As applied to most uncreative work, the evidence theory alone is sufficient to justify
denying protection. For example, while reasonable minds might disagree over whether
food recipes should be denied protection because of their arguably low social value or,
quite the opposite, because of the public’s strong interest in free access to this
information, the evidence theory moots the debate. No matter what the right answer to the
social value and public access questions, recipes should be excluded because copyright
protection in this instance would present an extraordinary problem with respect to proof.
109

Interestingly, Jaszi ultimately applauds the result in Gracen, arguing that Posner’s real motivation
was an “implicit recognition of a hierarchy of artistic productions.” Id. at 462. As Jaszi explains, “it is
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The social costs of resolving those evidentiary difficulties would likely outweigh any
social benefits that might accrue from protecting recipes in the first place.
Ironically, the main implications of the evidence theory therefore come in cases
where the evidence theory is not compelling and, because of that, the only way to justify
the search for creativity is to lean on one of the traditional and more troubling
explanations. Feist is one such case. There was no evidence problem in Feist because
Rural had planted in its original directory a handful of fictitious listings—entries that
were included for the very purpose of detecting unauthorized copying.113 Had Feist
compiled its own telephone listings, or had it even simply confirmed the listings provided
by Rural, it would have detected the false entries and eliminated them. Feist did neither.
Four fake listings thus survived in Feist’s directory, testifying to the fact of copying and
also suggesting its approximate extent.114
This does not mean that Rural should have won its copyright case. But it does mean
that the only way to justify the Court’s reliance on creativity is to tell a compelling story
about social value, production costs, or the public’s interest in free access to telephone
information. That, frankly, is hard to do. The telephone directory at issue was obviously
expensive to create and valuable once created, so those rationales do not work. That
leaves only one plausible rationale, namely that copyright was in this case rightly denied
because the public has a strong interest in free telephone information. But that is not so
clearly right. Local telephone companies must earn revenues sufficient to cover the
substantial fixed costs of the telephone plant. It might be in the public interest to
recognize copyright in telephone directories and in that way allow telephone companies
to earn some of that necessary revenue through the sale of Yellow Page advertisements
rather than to deny copyright and thereby force regulators to approve higher telephone
rates.115
Whatever one thinks of this argument, it certainly makes clear that creativity itself
says nothing about the right answer in this case. It is possible that Rural should have won,
and it is possible that Rural should have lost. But it borders on the absurd to decide the
case by asking whether telephone listings are creative. The standard rationales for the
113

499 U.S. at 344.
The false entries in Feist did no harm because no consumer was ever going to look up a nonexistent
neighbor. The same might not be true for false entries on a map or in a research database. Thus, the use of
fictional information is only plausible for certain types of work.
Note, too, that in Feist an independent copyright claim could have been raised with respect to the false
listings. They were creative, after all, and thus one could argue that at least those entries should have been
protected by copyright. Lawyers likely did not advance this argument because (1) the copying probably
would have been deemed de minimis and (2) Rural would have had a hard time showing that any damages
flowed from this copying.
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Judge Greene adopted this position in United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 552 F.
Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983), the decision that accepted, with modifications, the
consent decree that settled the government’s antitrust case against the Bell Telephone Company. One issue
at play was the question of whether post-divestiture local telephone carriers should be allowed to continue
producing Yellow Page directories. Judge Greene thought they should, on grounds that “the Yellow Pages
provide a significant subsidy to local telephone rates” and that the “loss of this large subsidy” would lead to
higher rates, a result “clearly contrary to the goal of providing affordable telephone service for all
Americans.” Id. at 193-94. For a fuller discussion of how best to recover the fixed costs of the telephone
network, see Benjamin et al., Telecommunications Law and Policy 621-23 (2001); Kenneth Train, Optimal
Regulation 117-40 (1991) (discussing Ramsey pricing).
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creativity requirement do not work here, and the evidence theory—which usually can be
relied on to justify the focus on creativity even when the other rationales fail—is also
inapt thanks to Rural’s clever use of false information. The Court’s focus on creativity
thus cannot be justified as a policy matter, and in the end that focus meant that the key
issues on which this case should have turned were never briefed, analyzed, or resolved.
One might be tempted to dismiss all this as much ado about nothing. No legal regime
works perfectly, and thus the fact that the Court decided one case on seemingly irrelevant
grounds is only so important. But it turns out that there is a large category of work for
which this same problem recurs: works, like telephone directories, that are for the most
part collections of facts. As I will explain below, for these works the creativity
requirement is today a significant obstacle to protection. Yet there is typically no
evidence problem. And, while sometimes valid in particular cases, concerns about public
access, social value, and production costs do not justify a blanket rule barring protection.
Think about evidence first. Evidentiary issues are typically quite manageable in these
cases because fact-intensive research generates a rich paper trail. Suppose, for example,
that two biographers each decide to write the life story of boxer Lennox Lewis. True, the
resulting works would both likely tell a similar tale of a young man who grew up in
London and went on to win Olympic Gold in Seoul. But a court would have no trouble
determining whether the biographers copied from one another as opposed to working
independently. After all, the very act of researching Lewis’ life should generate evidence
in the form of airline tickets, taped interviews, and the like, evidence that would clearly
and easily distinguish cases of innocent similarity from those of impermissible copying.
If evidence does not justify exclusion, do any of the other theories explain why all
factual works should be denied protection? Surely not the social value and production
cost rationales, because factual works are often of great value and also often expensive to
create. As for the public’s strong interest in having access to factual information, I have
already argued that this interest cuts both ways.116 If the goal is to increase the public’s
access to factual information, it is not clear whether the best approach is to offer
copyright and thereby increase the incentive to gather and disseminate this material, or
deny copyright and thereby maximize public access to information that is or will be made
available. At best, then, this rationale justifies denying protection in some fraction of the
cases, but surely not all of them.
Are there other concerns, then, that justify a ban on protection? Courts have in the
past worried that by recognizing copyright in facts, copyright law would create patentlike monopolies in factual information.117 But that is not true. Copyright stops only
unauthorized borrowing. So, even if one party were to hold copyright in some particular
fact it discovered, another party could always return to primary sources and re-gather that
same information. Recognizing copyright in a biography of Lennox Lewis would
therefore not mean that there would be only one book about his life; it would simply
116

See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Moore Pub., Inc. v. Big Sky Marketing, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 1371, 1379 (Idaho 1990) (“By
placing ideas and facts beyond copyright protection, while allowing protection for the expression of those
ideas or the arrangement of those facts, the Copyright Act prevents monopolization of facts or ideas”);
Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 204 (2d Cir. 1983), rev’d on other grounds, 471
U.S. 539 (1985) (worrying that copyright might inadvertently allow an individual to be “the owner of an
important political event merely by being the first to depict that event in words”).
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mean that later authors would either have to confirm the various factual claims
themselves or (more likely) cut a deal with the first author. The exact scope of
permissible borrowing would need to be worked out—it would be hard, for example, to
negate all the benefits that a second researcher inevitably enjoys—but no matter how the
nuances are resolved, it is clear that one can recognize copyright in these instances
without creating monopolies in factual material.
Courts have also worried that, in certain settings, a second-comer might not be able
to re-confirm a first author’s factual claims. That is admittedly an important special case,
and it might be that the fair use doctrine should be available to excuse unauthorized
borrowing in such circumstances.118 It would be impossible, for example, for a second
videographer to capture footage of the Kennedy assassination, and certainly that fact is
relevant when considering the appropriate scope of protection for the original video
images.119 Similarly, some factual research might be so expensive that it exhibits natural
monopoly properties.120 The costs of sending an unmanned vehicle to explore the Titanic
wreckage are exorbitant even given modern technology; so, while it is technically
feasible for a second exploration, the economics might mean that the Titanic example
should be thought of as parallel to the Kennedy example. But, again, these are special
cases that would likely justify special exceptions. In most situations, facts can be
independently gathered by multiple parties and thus copyright would not yield monopoly.
Another concern that must be accounted for is the worry that protection of factual
information will lead to wasteful duplication of research.121 The possibility of Coasian
bargaining calls that claim into question; the fact that the second-comer can re-gather the
information should set up a dynamic where the first party licenses to the second and
thereby avoids any wasteful duplication. But many respected commentators worry that
transaction costs, strategic behavior, and other forms of market breakdown will block the
bargain; and, in cases where that seems plausible, again intellectual property rules could
be tailored accordingly.122
My claim with respect to factual works, then, is not that all factual work should be
protected or even that factual work, when protected, should be accorded exactly the same
scope of protection that is accorded creative work. Instead, my claim is only that a lack of
118

The fair use doctrine excuses infringement in instances where leniency seems appropriate on policy
grounds. The doctrine was codified in 1976, but it nevertheless remains a free-wheeling policy inquiry,
allowing flexible responses to exceptional situations like those identified in the text. See 17 U.S.C. §107
(offering a non-exclusive list of factors to consider).
119
Cf. Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates, 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (rejecting the argument
that the Kennedy footage “could not be the subject of copyright because . . . to allow copyright would result
in the appropriation of the subject matter” but nevertheless finding unauthorized copying to be fair use).
120
A market exhibits the properties of a natural monopoly in instances where a single firm can satisfy
market demand at a lower total cost than can two or more firms. Among the policy implications are: (1)
competition in such a market is wasteful because total costs are greater than they could be in its absence;
and (2) there is some danger that only one firm can survive economically, and thus natural monopoly
markets might in the long term tend to become monopolized. For a general discussion, see Benjamin et al.,
supra note 115 at 374-80.
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See, e.g., Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 310 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967) (“it is just such wasted effort that the proscription against the copyright of
ideas and facts . . . [is] designed to prevent.”).
122
Jane Ginsburg, for example, questions the viability of market forces in this setting and advocates the
use of compulsory licenses. See Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 1916-37.
22

Copyright as a Rule of Evidence

creativity is not itself a good reason to deny these works protection. False facts and rich
paper trails both operate in this context to minimize any evidentiary concerns, and none
of the other rationales justify a general prohibition. Moreover, there are strong arguments
to be made in favor of at least some narrow form of protection. After all, the same freerider problem that (from an economic perspective) justifies copyright protection for
creative work seems to justify protection for factual work as well.
The details here of course require more thought. For instance, maybe protection
should extend only to certain classes of facts, or maybe it should apply only to facts that
are captured in database form.123 Federal copyright law today cannot adequately explore
these details because the Constitution has been interpreted to require that copyright
analysis stop at the question of whether a work is creative. This yields a blanket rule
denying protection to factual works and precludes the more careful analysis that the topic
deserves.
Worse, this is not just a problem for copyright law but in fact threatens to be a
problem for federal law more generally. Consider, for example, Congress’ recent
attempts to use its authority under the Commerce Clause to protect databases from certain
types of unauthorized duplication.124 Many scholars think that copyright law’s creativity
requirement renders this legislation unconstitutional. Their logic: Under Feist, the
Constitution authorizes Congress to award copyright protection only to works that
demonstrate some modicum of creativity; the proposed legislation must therefore be
unconstitutional because it allows Congress to skirt the constitutional limitations imposed
by the Copyright Clause simply by invoking the Commerce Clause.125 If this argument
holds, then Feist in effect bars all forms of federal protection for uncreative work, and it
does so without any policy rationale capable of supporting that result.
II. Fixation
There are two main prerequisites to federal copyright protection. The first,
considered in the previous section of this Article, is the requirement that an eligible work
be original to the author in question. The second requirement, and the subject of this
section, is the requirement that an eligible work be “fixed in any tangible medium of
expression.”126
The key statutory provision is section 102(a) of the Copyright Act. That provision
states, in relevant part, that federal copyright protection begins when original expression
is captured in a physical form from which it can be “perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated.”127 To take some simple examples, a playwright satisfies this requirement
by preparing a typewritten manuscript or by filming a performance of his play on
123

For some interesting lessons from the European experience with database protection, see Stephen M.
Maurer et al., Europe’s Database Experiment, 294 Science 789 (2001).
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See, e.g., H.R. 3531, 104th Cong. (1996) (“Database Investment and Intellectual Property Antipiracy
Act of 1996”); H.R. 2652, 105th Cong. (1998) (“Collections of Information Antipiracy Act”); H.R. 354,
106th Cong. (1999) (“Collections of Information Antipiracy Act”).
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For discussion, see Paul J. Heald, The Extraction/Duplication Dichotomy: Constitutional LineDrawing in the Database Debate, 62 Ohio St. L.J. 933 (2001); Paul Goldstein, Copyright (2d. ed. 2000) at
2.2.1 (interpreting Feist to implicitly authorize this use of the Commerce Clause).
126
17 U.S.C. §102(a).
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Id.
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videotape; and a composer satisfies the requirement by creating sheet music or recording
an album. Fixation is a broad concept. The statute defines acceptable fixations to include
“any tangible medium . . . now known or later developed, from which [expression] can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device.”128
The most striking aspect of the fixation requirement is that an acceptable tangible
embodiment does not need to survive for any significant period of time. Fixation is like a
trigger. Copyright protection commences the moment there exists a physical embodiment
“sufficiently permanent or stable to permit [the associated expression] to be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.”129
Thus, expression captured in a computer’s memory can be sufficiently fixed even though
the expression would be immediately lost were the computer to lose power;130 and an
author can intentionally destroy the fixation on which his copyright is based without in
any way endangering his statutory rights.131 In short, fixation does not imply permanence.
Once a physical embodiment exists, copyright begins, and nothing more turns on the
continued existence of that physical embodiment.
Fixation is easily accomplished for most works. Books, paintings, and motion
pictures are all natural ways for an author to communicate expression to others, and—
even if quickly lost or destroyed—these embodiments all adequately fix expression for
the purposes of federal copyright eligibility. Sheet music and sound recordings are
similarly natural ways to communicate musical compositions, and these, too, typically
suffice. The fixation requirement turns out to be a significant hurdle only with respect to
a narrow category of works, primarily those that are performed but not recorded.132
Certain types of choreography might fall into this category,133 as might impromptu
performances like standup comedy and interactive theater.134 Also excluded from
copyright on these grounds are purely oral communications like folk tales and unrecorded
radio broadcasts,135 and certain evanescent art forms such as sand castles, ice carvings,
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This was not always true. For example, right before Congress clarified the issue in the 1909 Act, the
Supreme Court interpreted the preexisting copyright statute such that piano rolls did not constitute a
physical “copy” of their associated musical works. White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1
(1908). The Court did so because piano rolls were not directly accessible to humans but were, instead, parts
of a machine that produced musical tones only after being connected to the rest of the mechanism. Id. at 17.
Today, by contrast, piano rolls would surely constitute adequate fixations.
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17 U.S.C. §101 (definition of “fixed”).
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See, e.g., Advanced Computer Servs. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356 (1994) (considering
whether copies of computer software stored in RAM memory constitute fixed copies).
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See, e.g., Pacific & Southern Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1984) (recognizing copyright
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declining to preempt state law as applied to unfixed works).
133
For discussion particular to choreography, see Comment, Leslie Erin Wallis, The Different Art:
Choreography and Copyright, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 1363 (1986).
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On interactive theater, see Gregory Donat, Note, Fixing Fixation: A Copyright with Teeth for
Improvisational Performers, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1363 (1997).
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See, e.g., Fritz v. Arthur D. Little, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 95 (D. Mass. 1996) (oral presentations);
Fallwell v. Penthouse International, 521 F. Supp. 1204 (W.D. Va. 1981) (spoken words).
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and, arguably, graphical displays that appear but then disappear from computer
screens.136
This section argues that the main justification for the fixation requirement is that
unfixed work would present considerable challenges with respect to proof. The analysis
proceeds in three parts. The first considers the history of the fixation requirement in
federal law. The purpose of this historical survey is to better understand how fixation
currently works and what purposes lawmakers might have thought it would serve. The
second subsection considers a variety of possible rationales for the fixation requirement,
for example the argument that fixation serves to create an archive of society’s cultural
accomplishments. Finally, the third subsection articulates the evidence rationale and uses
it to criticize the modern fixation requirement.
A. Foundations
The phrase “fixed in any tangible medium of expression” was first introduced to
copyright law by the 1976 Act, but the basic idea of requiring a tangible embodiment was
part of federal copyright law right from the start. The Constitution authorizes Congress to
protect “writings,” and almost any definition of that term would seem to require a
physical rendering.137 This would certainly have been true had the word been interpreted
literally and thus taken to include only objects like books, letters, and other paper
documents from which words are directly accessible to readers. Even as courts and the
Congress adopted more generous interpretations, however, the common thread was
always (and quite naturally) an assumption that “writings” had to be in physical form.
Thus, in the same opinion where it reminded lower courts that the term “writings” is
not to be construed in its “narrow literal sense but, rather, with the reach necessary to
reflect the broad scope of constitutional principle,” the Supreme Court limited the term to
mean only “physical rendering[s]” of expression.138 Similarly, in a different case, Judge
Learned Hand wrote a dissent to argue that the relevant majority had taken too narrow a
view of copyright’s permissible subject matter, but even there Judge Hand drew the line
at physical manifestation. Any work can be a constitutional writing, argued Hand,
provided that the expression can be “embodied in a physical form capable of being
copied.”139 Congress has never pushed this boundary. While federal law has over time
significantly expanded the categories of what is deemed eligible for copyright—the
earliest statute focused on maps, books, and charts, while the modern statute includes
motion pictures, sculpture, and the like—no federal copyright statute has ever attempted
to protect completely intangible expression.140 In the courts and implicitly in Congress,
136

This has been and continues to be a contentious issue, for example in cases involving the visual
output of computer video games. See, e.g., Digital Communications Associates, Inc. v. Softklone
Distribution, 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987); Advanced Computer Servs. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F.
Supp. 356 (1994).
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dissenting) (dissenting in part, concurring in part) (at issue was the copyright eligibility of sound
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recording of live musical performances. See Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994), codified at 17
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then, the Constitution itself has been interpreted to establish a basic fixation requirement,
and that interpretation took hold long before the 1976 Act formally introduced the
fixation requirement to federal law.
The Copyright Act of 1909 also foreshadowed what would become the modern Act’s
fixation requirement.141 Under the 1909 Act, the primary means by which an author could
trigger copyright protection was by “publishing” an original expressive work. In
particular, an author could secure copyright through publication so long as each
published copy contained a notice of copyright that complied with various statutory
formalities.142 Publication was a critical moment under the 1909 Act both for acquiring
and for forfeiting copyright rights: publication with adequate copyright notice would
immediately bring a work into the federal regime, but publication without adequate
notice would immediately inject the work into the public domain.143 How does this tie
into the fixation requirement? Under the relevant case law, “publication” could occur
only after the relevant expression was put in tangible form. As one influential
commentator summarized the cases, a work was published only when “the original or
tangible copies . . . were sold, leased, loaned, given away, or otherwise made available to
the general public.”144 Thus oral remarks,145 public performances,146 and even radio

be a copyright statute. Nevertheless, the statute is interesting in that, on the one hand, it creates rights in an
intangible—live performances—yet, on the other hand, those rights are only relevant in instances where
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has a fixation requirement of sorts, the only difference being that fixation under this statute might not be
accomplished by the relevant author or his agent, but might instead be accomplished by some would-be
pirate. For further discussion of this anti-bootleg provision, see Leaffer, supra note 82, at 50-52.
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Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075, 1078 (repealed by the Copyright Act of
1976).
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author wanted to show that he had published his work and thereby triggered protection (“investive”
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not published and hence it did not matter that he had failed to give adequate copyright notice (“divestive”
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his speech . . . no matter how vast his audience, did not amount to a general publication of his literary
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American Vitagraph, Inc. v. Levy, 659 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir. 1981); Burke v. NBC, 598 F. 2d 688 (1st Cir.
1979).
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broadcasts147 were not publications for copyright purposes, whereas mass distributions of
books or pamphlets148 obviously were.
The 1909 Act implicitly required fixation in another way as well. Section 13 of the
1909 Act stated that, after an author triggered federal protection through publication with
notice, the author had to deposit with the Copyright Office “two complete copies” of the
published work.149 Exceptions to this deposit obligation were recognized for cases were it
was “impracticable to deposit copies because of their size, weight, fragility, or monetary
value,” but even in these instances a photograph or other identifying physical
reproduction was required.150 Deposit was thus in practical effect another fixation
requirement. The requirement was not particularly strict—the statute stated that copies
should be deposited “promptly”151 but the Supreme Court held that deposit could be
made any time prior to the filing of an infringement action152—yet it was a statutory
obligation that unfixed expression could not satisfy, and it thus further reinforced the
notion that intangible works were ineligible for protection under the 1909 Act.
The discussion above focuses on published work; but statutory provisions applicable
to unpublished work further established an implicit fixation requirement. Other than
publication with notice, the only way to claim federal copyright under the 1909 Act was
to register an unpublished work with the government.153 Not all categories of unpublished
expression were eligible for protection by registration; the statute included a specific list
of eligible categories.154 Even for eligible works, however, fixation was a precondition to
registration. Again, this was not an explicit requirement set forth in the statute; but the
only way to register an unpublished work was to submit to the Copyright Office a copy of
the work in tangible form.155 Thus, fixation was in practice mandatory. Interestingly,
unpublished works did not have to be completely fixed in order to be registered under the
1909 Act. An unpublished motion picture, for example, could be registered by the
submission of just “one print taken from each scene or act.”156
Building on this base, the 1976 Act introduced fixation as a separate prerequisite to
federal protection. The House Report for the 1976 Act suggests that the new provision
“perpetuates the existing requirement that a work be fixed in a tangible medium of
expression,”157 and, although the Report does not draw these analogies, the modern
fixation requirement does indeed seem to be modeled after the 1909 Act’s publication,
registration, and deposit provisions. For example, the fact that fixations are not required
to survive much beyond their first moments of existence suggests that lawmakers were
thinking about publication when crafting the fixation requirement. Publication under the
147
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1909 Act was a discrete act that took place at the start of the copyright term. By
interpreting fixation as they did, lawmakers gave fixation a similar feel: fixation marks
the start of the copyright term, but it is not an obligation that lasts much beyond that
triggering event.
At the same time, the new fixation requirement did represent a significant change
from the fixation requirement previously implicit in the publication, deposit, and
registration provisions. Under those provisions, fixation alone was never enough. To
qualify for protection through publication, for example, an author had to not only capture
his expression in tangible form but also engage in an appropriate form of public
dissemination with notice. Registration similarly conditioned protection on fixation plus
an additional act, in this case deposit of that fixation with the government. The 1976
copyright revision eliminated these additional requirements, recognizing copyright on the
basis of fixation alone. That greatly expanded the number of works eligible for federal
protection and was therefore a significant re-envisioning of fixation’s role in the
copyright regime.158
B. Rationales
One virtue of fixation is that it increases the likelihood that the relevant expression
will be passed from place to place, person to person, and generation to generation.
Unrecorded expression—say, a folk tale—is difficult to transfer over time and space.
Fixed expression, by contrast, is durable and transferable. One possible rationale for the
fixation requirement, then, might be that it increases the nation’s cultural stockpile,
enriching society by making expression more accessible and long-lasting.159
Such an explanation would be consistent with copyright’s deposit requirement. As
was discussed above, copyright holders have long been required to deposit copies of their
published works with the Copyright Office. Those copies are then passed to the Library
of Congress, and from there the copies can be accessed by the public. The House Report
on a copyright revision act from 1989 explicitly justifies deposit on cultural grounds,
explaining that deposit creates “a strong and dynamic national library . . . that acquires,
preserves and makes accessible . . . the material expressions of our national cultural
life.”160
Of course, if cultural preservation really were the goal, both deposit and fixation
could do more. Deposit, for example, is today enforced only by a system of modest
158

Even under the 1976 Act, publication, registration, and deposit continued to be important concepts.
Publication remained relevant because, until the law changed again in 1989, an author could still forfeit
federal rights if he published his protected work without adequate notice. See Copyright Act of 1976,
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fines.161 The requirement would have significantly more bite if failure to deposit would
result in, say, the complete loss of copyright protection. Similarly, fixations are deemed
acceptable even if they last only a short period of time. Fixation would be more effective
at preserving expression if tangible embodiments were required to survive for a longer
period. All this can be explained, however. Modern copyright law in many ways has
attempted to ease the burdens associated with qualifying for and maintaining
copyright;162 thus, the leniency built into the modern fixation and deposit requirements
might just be the result of a balance between the desire to have a long-lasting written
archive and the desire to avoid any rules that might make it too difficult to qualify for or
maintain federal rights.
One might similarly ask why the law would use both fixation and deposit to further
the goal of cultural preservation when deposit, it seems, could accomplish this goal by
itself. The answer most likely is that the Copyright Office cannot reasonably handle the
full burden. Even today, a time when only published works are subject to the deposit
requirement, many works are removed from the collection after five years due to limited
storage space.163 This practical difficulty would grow exponentially worse were deposit
extended to include all the many unpublished works that today are fixed but not
deposited. Thus fixation can be defended from this criticism on grounds that fixation is a
valuable supplement to deposit.
A more devastating criticism is that the archival rationale turns on an errant
assumption: the assumption that the fixation requirement is effective at encouraging
authors to fix expression. After all, the archival rationale explains fixation only if, by
requiring fixation, the law increases the number of works that are fixed and thereby
increases the cultural archive. But that seems unlikely. Even without the fixation
requirement, fixation is already cheap, easy, and significantly in an author’s own interest.
A videotape is a sufficient fixation, and even that inexpensive embodiment would
significantly help an author prove his case in the event of infringement litigation. There is
thus already a strong incentive to fix—and the extra pressure brought on by the fixation
requirement likely has little marginal impact.
A second and more promising rationale for the fixation requirement is that it helps to
distinguish authors whose expressive activities were motivated by copyright from authors
for whom copyright was an afterthought. Drawing this sort of distinction would be
desirable because, while copyright is likely worth its costs in instances where it
encourages expressive production, copyright might not be worthwhile in cases where the
promise of protection did not in any way increase the incentive to create.164 Given how
161

17 U.S.C. §407(d).
See, e.g., Berne Convention Implementation Act, supra note 14 (eliminating notice as prerequisite to
protection).
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See Policy Statement on Deposit Retention Schedule, Library of Congress, 48 Fed. Reg. 12,862
(1983) (announcing a policy under which most published materials are to be discarded after five years of
retention due to limited storage space).
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Copyright protection is designed to encourage dissemination as well as creation. Thus, there might
be reason to recognize copyright even in instances where the relevant author was not originally motivated
by the allure of copyright protection. Similarly, copyright law serves to discourage self-help, for example
elaborate encryption schemes. Discouraging attempts at self-help might therefore be another reason to
recognize copyright even if copyright was not a motivating factor with respect to the work’s original
creation.
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easy it is to fix expression, it is reasonable to assume that authors who fail to fix their
works within a certain period of time are not thinking about copyright protection and,
hence, should be excluded from the federal regime. Such exclusions would benefit
society (because this expression would be free for all to use) without diminishing
expressive production (because in these instances copyright was not a relevant incentive
in the first place.)
This rationale in essence treats fixation as a signal, and that is both a strength and a
weakness. The strength is that, if fixation is just a signal, then it is easy to see why
fixations need only last a short period of time. Once an author fixes his work, the signal is
given, and there is no reason to demand that the resulting tangible object survive for a
long time thereafter. The weakness: fixation seems too simple an act to serve as an
effective signal in that it generates too many false positives. Consumers write down their
shopping lists, after all, yet by that act they are in no way meaning to imply that
copyright law motivates their expression. If copyright law really were trying to establish
a signal that would reveal author motivations, a better approach would be to choose a less
conventional act as the relevant signal. The 1909 Act did this through its requirement that
authors put a copyright notice on all published works. Copyright notice was such an
unusual combination of markings—typically, the letter “c” inside a circle, plus the
author’s name and the date of first publication, all placed at a location specified by the
statute165—that the resulting signal was cumbersome but unambiguous. Anyone who was
motivated by copyright law could (in theory) give the signal,166 but anyone not thinking
of copyright was unlikely to stumble into protection through good fortune alone.167
Other possible rationales for fixation focus on various practical ramifications that are
loosely associated with fixation. For example, fixation exposes a work to greater risk of
infringement because, with physical embodiments available, an author will have a hard
time monitoring access to and use of his work. This increased risk might justify increased
protection. Similarly, fixation increases an author’s ability to profit from his work
because fixed versions can be sold, leased, and otherwise profitably transferred. That
might explain why federal law starts the copyright term at the moment of fixation. Such a
policy supports the author’s profit-seeking activities in the short term but, by starting the
clock on copyright protection, ensures that after a period of profit-making activity
copyright will end and the work will be dedicated to the public. These types of practical
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17 U.S.C. §19 (repealed 1976).
For many years, lawmakers debated whether the notice requirement was too technical, leading to
“arbitrary and unjust forfeitures” of copyright in cases where an author was caught unaware by the notice
obligation or erred in trying to satisfy it. House Rep., supra note 18, at 143.
167
The House Report on the 1976 Act lists as one of the “principal functions” of the notice requirement
that it places “in the public domain a substantial body of published material that no one is interested in
copyrighting.” House Rep., supra note 18, at 143. Of course, the notice requirement served other purposes
as well. For example, it served to “inform[] the public as to whether a particular work is copyrighted.” Id.
Comparing the notice requirement to fixation reveals another important difference: notice had to be
accomplished at or near the moment of publication, whereas fixation can occur any time before the filing of
an infringement action. The more strict timing obligation inherent in the notice requirement makes it a
better signal. Everyone, after all, is thinking about copyright right before they file suit; the interesting
question is to ask whether a given author was thinking about publication when he first created (or
disseminated) his expressive work.
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explanations were often used to justify the 1909 Act’s publication requirement,168 and, as
discussed below, they have some allure when it comes to explaining fixation as well.
Consider, first, the argument that the act of fixation puts a work at increased risk of
infringement and thus justifies increased legal protection. This logic would explain
fixation but for the fact that fixation is such a poor proxy for risk.169 Publication was a
plausible proxy for risk because there actually is increased risk the moment a work leaves
the immediate control of its author and is instead made available to some fraction of the
general public.170 But fixation? Expression can be fixed but nonetheless remain in its
author’s tight control, as it does, for example, with a personal diary. Conversely,
expression can be unfixed and yet significantly at risk, as it is with expression made
available in playhouses or broadcast over the airwaves via radio and television. Thus, if
copyright law really were looking to identify a moment of increased risk to an author, it
would be odd to focus on the moment of fixation instead of, say, publication or
dissemination.171
As for the second argument—that fixation marks the start of significant financial
returns and thus should also mark the start of the copyright term—this argument was
much stronger as applied to publication than it is as applied to fixation. Under the 1909
Act, copyright terms were measured from the moment of first publication. A work first
published in 1958, for example, was (under 1909 law) free for all to use a maximum of
fifty-six years later.172 Under modern law, by contrast, copyright expires a given number
of years after the relevant author’s death, regardless of when any specific work was first
fixed.173 Thus, if the quid pro quo is that the author begins to earn profits but in exchange
must start to see his copyright term run, modern law does not implement the bargain.174
No matter when each work was fixed, copyright for all of an author’s works end at the
same time.175
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See, e.g., Leaffer, supra note 82, at 147 (explaining publication as the moment where an author
begins to earn the economic fruits of his labor and thus, in exchange, the moment where the clock starts to
run on protection).
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The risk argument does make sense of the fact that fixations are required to last only for periods of
non-transitory duration. After all, once the genie is out of the bottle, the author remains at risk even if the
original fixation is destroyed.
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As Gorman & Ginsburg point out, however, the concept of publication was “not always coterminous
with the general notion of ‘making public’” but was, instead, often a “rather technical construct.” See
Gorman & Ginsburg, supra note 143, at 384.
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At the time of the 1976 Act, the Register of Copyrights advocated the use of “dissemination” as the
standard instead of “publication” or, presumably, “fixation.” See Register’s Report on the General Revision
of the U.S. Copyright Law 40-42 (1961).
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See 17 U.S.C. §24 (repealed 1976). Due to the 1976 revisions, a work first published in 1958 has
actually ended up with a term of 95 years. See 17 U.S.C. §304(a)(1)(B).
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See 17 U.S.C. §302.
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One caveat: the 1976 Act does preempt state law that might have otherwise recognized perpetual
rights. See 17 U.S.C. §301. Thus, federal protection starts the clock on an author’s rights in the limited
sense that, prior to qualifying for federal protection, in at least some states the author would have enjoyed
perpetual protection, either under state statutes or under common law copyright. This seems like a trivial
sacrifice, however, given how long federal copyright terms today last.
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This could be changed, of course, but such a change would open up a wide range of additional policy
issues related to the relative benefits of fixed versus relative copyright terms. See House Rep., supra note
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Some cynical observers might be tempted to explain fixation as a ploy through which
copyright increases the number of works in the public domain. This was a common
explanation for the notice provisions that were in effect until 1989. Under the 1909 Act,
notice was subject to so many complicated formalities that many authors who attempted
to include adequate notice nevertheless failed, thereby forfeiting their federal rights.
Those works fell into the public domain, enriching the stockpile of expression that was
free for all to use.176 Obligations under an international copyright treaty ultimately forced
Congress to eliminate notice as an obstacle to protection,177 but one could argue that
fixation has perhaps taken over the role.
This cynical argument is ultimately untenable on two grounds. First, while works
published without notice fell directly into the public domain under pre-1989 law, unfixed
works do not today became part of the public domain. Instead, unfixed works simply are
not eligible for federal protection. Section 301 of the modern Act makes this clear by
explicitly declining to preempt state law that might protect unfixed work.178 Many such
state protections exist. A California statute, for example, protects “any original work of
authorship that is not fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”179 Thus, unlike work
published without notice, unfixed works are not necessarily free for all to use.
Second, even if unfixed works were immediately thrust into the public domain, it is
unclear how valuable that would be. After all, under 1909 law, consumers could readily
determine which works were free for all to use. A consumer had only to inspect the
published work and determine whether it had adequate notice. If it did not, that work was
probably in the public domain.180 Unfixed works, by contrast, are not readily identified.
18, at 133-37 (explaining why duration should be tied to the life of the author as opposed to the date of first
publication).
176
The renewal provisions were equally tricky, and they had a similar effect. For example, Frank
Capra’s classic film, “It’s a Wonderful Life,” fell into the public domain because the company that held
copyright in the film failed to file a renewal application during the film’s twenty-eighth year of protection.
See Gorman & Ginsburg, supra note 143, at 355.
177
Most industrialized nations and many developing countries are signatories to the Berne Convention,
a multilateral treaty that, among other things, forbids formalities that might make it difficult for foreign
authors to qualify for copyright protection in member nations. See Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1986, revised Paris, July 24, 1971, art. 5(2), 25 U.S.T. 1341, T.I.A.S.
No. 7868, 828 U.N.T.S. 221. Several statutes have gradually adjusted United States law to meet obligations
under the Berne Convention, most prominently the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, cited
supra note 14.
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17 U.S.C. §301(b)(1).
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Cal. Civ. Code § 980(a)(1).
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The 1909 Act excused some accidental omissions of copyright notice (17 U.S.C. §21 (repealed
1976)), so, in some cases, a consumer could pick up a copy of a work, see no copyright notice, duplicate
the work, and still turn out to have infringed copyright. Instances of this sort were rare, however, because
courts refused to recognize this statutory exception in cases where the omission was due to “neglect or
oversight” (Sieff v. Continental Auto Supply, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 683 (D. Minn. 1941)) or due to mistake of
law (Wildman v. New York Times, 42 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1941)). Besides, even in cases where
accidental omission was excused, alleged infringers were only liable to the extent that they had actual
notice of the relevant copyright. As a functional matter, then, these works were in the public domain.
Note that federal copyright law ultimately adopted a more forgiving policy than that available under
1909 law. For example, 17 U.S.C. §405 creates exceptions for de minimis omissions and also for works
registered within five years of any omission, and 17 U.S.C. §401 fully eliminates the notice requirement for
all works published after 1989.
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A patron at a playhouse, for example, has no way of knowing whether the play was
written out beforehand or is, instead, completely unfixed. Similarly, an audience member
at a comedy performance can never be sure that the performance is not being subtly
audio-taped from backstage. Thus, fixation does not seem to be a particularly helpful
mechanism by which to increase the public domain because consumers would never
know which works are, and which works are not, free for use.
Lastly, several sources suggest that the real purpose of the fixation requirement is to
narrow copyright’s purview. The court in Falwell v. Penthouse International181 raised
this point, worrying that, if copyright were to include unfixed expression, “every
utterance” would be protected and “the courts would be inundated” with copyright
claims.182 “[S]uch a result would run counter to the firmly established constitutional
guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press.”183 Wendy Gordon has similarly
argued that fixation serves to distinguish protected expression from “the ordinary stream
of speech,” in that way making sure that copyright applies only to a “limited set of
intellectual products.”184
This rationale has some force, but, as with several of the others, this one is
vulnerable to the criticism that fixation is not a very limiting doctrine. So much
expression is fixed—shopping lists, school reports, even messages left upon answering
machines—that fixation would be an odd solution to the problem of an overly inclusive
copyright system. The notice requirement was a valuable limiting doctrine in that it
actually did serve to exclude from copyright all sorts of casual expression that was not
disseminated with copyright in mind. But fixation is much less effective in that it cuts out
only a tiny fraction of expression. Thus, while this argument is correct as far as it goes, it
does not seem to go very far toward explaining the fixation requirement.
C. The Evidence Rationale
Several commentators have previously suggested that the fixation requirement is in
reality motivated by evidentiary concerns. “One of the most important reasons for
requiring fixation . . . as a condition precedent to copyright protection is to ensure that a
copyright claimant will be able to provide a court documentary evidence of the
copyrightable subject matter,” writes one commentator.185 Without fixation, “copyright
law would forever be mired in disputes over the definition and boundaries of the works
claiming copyright protection,” suggests another.186 Marshall Leaffer’s copyright treatise
puts it this way: “[W]hen a work is embodied in a tangible medium of expression, one
can point to something, enabling a court to determine whether infringement has taken
181

521 F. Supp. 1204 (W.D. Va. 1981).
Id. at 1207.
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place.”187 A guide to the requirements of the Berne Convention published by the World
Intellectual Property Organization similarly offers that the purpose of the fixation
requirement is to “prove[] the existence of the work.”188
The popularity of the evidence theory is easy to understand. Copyright endeavors to
protect an intangible—“expression”—yet intangibles by their very nature raise difficult
issues with respect to proof. It is not surprising, then, that an evidentiary justification is
ascribed to the one copyright doctrine that associates the intangible with some form of a
tangible medium. Much as a patent application marks the boundaries of a claimed
invention, and a deed makes clear the borders associated with land, a fixation makes plain
what is being claimed and allows that claim to be recorded as of a date certain.189
The evidence rationale resonates for another reason, too: in copyright, it is critically
important to know the exact content of protected expression. Close is simply not good
enough—and the reason is copyright’s idea/expression dichotomy. As most readers
already know, copyright protects only the expression of an idea but not the idea itself.190
For example, Alice Sebold’s copyright in the book, The Lovely Bones,191 recognizes in
Sebold certain exclusive rights with respect to her specific language, her particular
characters, her exact settings, and so on; but the copyright does not give her any
protection for the broad concept of a story where the main character has already moved
on to the afterlife and narrates the book as events continue to unfold on Earth. Copyright,
in other words, recognizes rights in the narrow, concrete, expressive embodiment of an
idea, but leaves the idea itself free for all to use.192
This links in with evidentiary concerns as follows. If the federal copyright regime
were forgiving when it came to evidentiary issues, the boundaries of any given copyright
claim would be unsure. That would be troubling because the whole point of the
idea/expression dichotomy is to recognize rights in the specific expression an author used
to write, sing, or code his inspiration, all without granting rights in the abstract ideas
communicated thereby. Without solid evidence, however, expression blurs into idea.
Think of a copyright claim related to a professor’s unfixed lectures. Give that lecture
enough times, and the overlapping claims begin more and more to approximate the
underlying idea. “Transaction costs are a bitch,” becomes the copyrighted intuition, not
the details of the particular professor’s eloquent expression thereof. In short, the
187
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idea/expression dichotomy cannot operate at a high level of imprecision, hence
evidentiary concerns are of particular importance for copyright.193
The fixation requirement works to address this evidentiary problem, although the
logic here is a little less straightforward than it might at first appear. The wrinkle is that
the fixation requirement does not serve evidentiary goals by encouraging authors to fix
their expression. True, encouraging fixation would serve evidentiary goals; but, as a
practical matter, the fixation requirement probably does not encourage fixation. As I
argued above, even without the fixation requirement, fixation is already cheap, easy, and
significantly in an author’s own interest.194 The legal requirement is thus superfluous
when it comes to incentives; even without the added pressure of the requirement, there is
a sufficiently strong incentive to fix, and any author who thinks of it will do so regardless
of the legal rule. What the fixation requirement does accomplish is that it serves as a
prophylactic remedy in cases where there never was any physical evidence of the claimed
expression. The fixation requirement excludes these cases from consideration. The
reasoning is the same as that articulated with respect to uncreative works: in these cases,
the social costs of litigation likely exceed the social benefits derived from offering
copyright protection in the first place.
Of course, if the fixation requirement really is best understood as a rule designed to
address evidentiary issues, the modern requirement has been implemented in a
shockingly un-ambitious fashion. The trouble is that the modern requirement excludes
only those cases where there never was any physical evidence of the claimed expression;
it does not exclude cases where there was evidence at some point in time but that
evidence was later lost or destroyed. Stated another way, federal law requires that
fixations survive for a period of “more than transitory duration” but it does not require
that fixations survive, say, until the moment of litigation.195 So, if a work was fixed in
paper form in 1980, but the relevant papers were destroyed in 1981 either by accident or
on purpose, modern law would nevertheless deem the work to be sufficiently fixed to
support litigation in 1982 or even 1990. On evidentiary grounds, this is difficult to
defend. There is barely any difference between a case where there was never any fixation
at all and a case where there was a fixation but it was destroyed before the relevant
litigation commenced. Yet that is exactly the line drawn by the modern fixation
requirement.
One can offer a half-hearted justification, namely that addressing these additional
cases would require a more complicated fixation rule. For instance, because copyright
terms today extend so long and tangible objects naturally degrade over time, lawmakers
might be reluctant to adopt a fixation rule that simply required, without exception, that
fixations survive until the moment of litigation. Such a rule would serve evidentiary
goals, but it would also punish authors whose works were lost through accident or natural
wear, and it would thus have the practical effect of (randomly) shortening copyright
duration. To avoid these effects, the rule would have to carve out exceptions. For
example, perhaps the rule would require authors to exert “reasonable efforts” to protect at
193
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least one fixation throughout the copyright term, thereby excusing authors whose
fixations naturally degraded but requiring authors in normal circumstances to either
preserve their work or forfeit protection. Alternatively, the law could require survival but
allow the requirement to be satisfied by the continued existence of any fixation, no matter
whether it is the original fixation or a duplicate thereof. For published works, this would
represent a significant relaxation of the otherwise harsh rule because, upon publication,
typically a large number of fixed copies are produced and disseminated, and it would be
the unusual case where all of those embodiments were destroyed.
Any of these rules would serve evidentiary goals better than the current rule does,
and the only drawback is that they would mean at least slightly increased administrative
costs. If those costs are not justified, one can understand why modern law takes the unambitious position it takes. But that, in turn, calls the fixation requirement itself into
question. Either there are significant efficiencies to be gained by excluding cases where
there is no meaningful physical evidence and hence the modern rule plus these more
complicated adjustments are all likely justified; or all this is merely rounding error and
hence fixation should not be required. But the current position—exclude cases where
there is absolutely no physical evidence but welcome cases where the evidence existed
for any period of more than transitory duration—seems an untenable middle ground,
unsupported by the evidence rationale or indeed any of the rationales surveyed in this
section.196
III. Other Copyright Doctrines
The previous sections combined to take an in-depth look at the two main
prerequisites to copyright protection: the requirement that a work be original, and the
requirement that a work be fixed in tangible form. This section offers a lighter survey of
three additional copyright doctrines on which the evidence theory sheds light: the merger
doctrine, the doctrine of scènes à faire, and the federal registration procedure. In each
case, I argue that while the doctrine at issue might in addition serve other purposes, one
primary function is to discourage litigation in instances where evidentiary concerns
would otherwise overwhelm.
A. The Merger Doctrine
A basic principle of copyright law is that copyright protects only the expression of an
idea but not the idea itself.197 An author who writes a book on how to lose weight, for
196

One possible explanation for the current fixation requirement might be that this is the best Congress
can do. After all, the constitutional term “writings” has been interpreted to require some form of a physical
manifestation. Congress cannot completely eliminate the fixation requirement, then, and thus Congress
might have chosen to do the next best thing: adopt the weakest fixation requirement imaginable, namely
one that recognizes as fixed any work that is even briefly captured in physical form. This explanation is
consistent with the sweeping language currently in effect, both in section 102, which states that acceptable
media include those “now known or later developed, from which [expression] can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device” (17 U.S.C.
§102(a)), and in section 101, which defines as fixed any expression that is “sufficiently permanent or stable
to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory
duration” (17 U.S.C. §101). Indeed, it is difficult to imagine more permissive definitions than these that
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This distinction is today codified at 17 U.S.C. §102(b), but it was an integral principle long before.
See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1880).
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example, can invoke copyright to protect her particular turns of phrase, but she cannot
invoke copyright to protect the actual weight loss strategy itself. Similarly—and this is an
example I used earlier in the Article—Alice Sebold’s copyright in the book, The Lovely
Bones, recognizes in Sebold certain exclusive rights with respect to her specific language,
her particular characters, her particular settings, and so on; but the copyright does not
give her any protection for the broad concept of a story narrated from the afterlife.198
The merger doctrine supplements this basic distinction between idea and expression.
It states that copyright protection will be denied in instances where there are only a few
ways to express a given idea.199 That is, contrary to the general rule, in these cases even
expression will not be protected. If there is only one way to articulate a given idea,200 or
if there are only a handful of ways to articulate that idea, no one can protect any of the
available alternatives.201 Expression and idea are said to “merge.” Courts typically
explain that protection is denied in order to “prevent an author from monopolizing an
idea merely by copyrighting a few expressions of it.”202
The merger doctrine originated with the First Circuit decision in Morrissey v.
Procter & Gamble Co.203 In dispute was the copyright associated with the rules for
Plaintiff’s “sweepstakes” promotional contest. Defendant attempted to conduct the same
basic promotion, and Plaintiff sued on grounds that Defendant had copied Plaintiff’s
rules. The claim was plausible. Defendant, for example, had published a rule stating that
entrants “should print name, address and Social Security number on a boxtop, or plain
paper,” whereas Plaintiff’s rule had required that entrants “should print name, address
and social security number on a Tide boxtop, or on plain paper.”204
A traditional copyright response to the case would have been to recognize copyright
in Plaintiff’s expression but to announce that Defendant was free to copy the underlying
idea. This would have made it impermissible for Defendant to copy the rules but
perfectly acceptable for Defendant to run a similar or identical contest. The court refused
to take this approach, however, worrying that protecting the expression in this instance
would inevitably protect the idea, too. Wrote the court:
198
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When the uncopyrightable [idea] is very narrow, so that the topic necessarily
requires, if not only one form of expression, at best only a limited number, to permit
copyrighting would mean that a party or parties, by copyrighting a mere handful of
forms, could exhaust all possibilities of future use of the [idea].205

This the court would not allow. Copyright, the court explained, was not “a game of chess
in which the public can be checkmated.”206
In the years since Morrissey, the merger doctrine has been frequently invoked. In
Allen v. Academic Games League of America,207 for example, it was applied to limit the
protection offered a variety of educational board games on grounds that the rules for the
games and the ideas behind the games would in certain instances merge.208 In Computer
Associates v. Altai, Inc.,209 it was similarly applied to limit the protection offered to
computer programs, the argument being that there are only a limited number of ways to
efficiently code particular functions and concepts.210 And in Tensor Group, Inc. v. Global
Web Systems, Inc.,211 the court struggled to decide whether merger should be invoked to
deny copyright to engineering drawings, the logic this time being that there are just a
limited number of ways to faithfully represent a complicated machine.212 In all of these
cases, the same concern drives the analysis. Where there are only a few ways to express a
given idea, courts worry that “rigorously protecting the expression [will] confer a
monopoly over the idea itself,” a result directly contrary to the fundamental principle that
copyright does not protect ideas.213
This standard account of the merger doctrine says nothing about evidence. Yet I
submit that the merger doctrine is in part motivated by an evidentiary concern. Think
again about Morrissey. Why was the court in that case so reluctant to recognize copyright
in Plaintiff’s expression? The court says that “by copyrighting a mere handful of forms,
[Plaintiff] could exhaust all possibilities of future use” of the sweepstakes idea.214 But
that is not true. Copyright would not have stopped Defendant from hearing about
Plaintiff’s sweepstakes promotion and then coming up with its own rules. Copyright
would only have stopped Defendant from copying Plaintiff’s rules. Indeed, just as readers
of the Sebold book are allowed to write their own stories about life after death, Defendant
would have been perfectly free to conduct an identical contest promotion. All that
Defendant would not have been allowed to do was copy Plaintiff’s expression.
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But the court rejected this approach on grounds that there were only a few ways to
express the sweepstakes idea. Why did this matter? Evidence. If the defendant in
Morrissey had done exactly what traditional analysis would have allowed him to do—if
he had borrowed the idea but then written his own expression—he would still likely have
ended up with expression that looked an awful lot like Plaintiff’s expression. As the court
pointed out, there are only a few ways to express this basic idea. That would have led to
an evidentiary quagmire. Defendant’s expression would have looked similar to
Plaintiff’s, and the court would have been hard-pressed to determine whether that
similarity was evidence of impermissible copying or, instead, innocent happenstance
given the limited number of options available.
This is a problem that applies generally to merger cases. Courts cannot reliably
distinguish permissible from impermissible behavior in these instances because, no
matter what, the resulting expression will typically look the same. So of course courts
worry that protection of expression in these cases will “effectively accord protection” to
the relevant underlying ideas. Without the merger doctrine, courts in some number of
cases would mistakenly find impermissible copying where, in truth, only the unprotected
idea was taken. As a practical matter, that would restrict the use of ideas in these settings.
Merger thus denies protection in cases where there are only a limited number of
expressive options.
B. Scènes à Faire
Copyright does not protect “stock” or standard literary devices. For example, no one
can claim rights to a shadowy private investigator who wears a trenchcoat, smokes
cigarettes, and enjoys a certain rapport with female clients, nor can anyone claim
protection for stereotypical dramatic elements like the use of military slogans, flags, and
armored vehicles as a backdrop for a motion picture about war. Courts refer to these
unprotected elements as “scènes à faire,” a French term that literally translates to mean
“scenes which must be done.”215 A common definition states that these are “incidents,
characters or settings which are as a practical matter indispensable, or at least standard, in
the treatment of a given topic.”216 This is a court-made doctrine, typically explained by
the observation that “it is virtually impossible” to write about certain “historical era[s] or
fictional theme[s]” without sometimes employing standard characters and motifs.217
There are two main reasons why a sensible copyright regime would deny protection
to scènes à faire. One is that, by making it easy for authors to rely on familiar and wellworn elements, the doctrine helps authors communicate basic information to their readers
quickly. An author does not need to invest any energy coming up with his own
background characters or suggestive details; an author can borrow familiar elements from
other sources and thereby readily set the stage for whatever new material the author
wishes to contribute. This justification in essence frames the doctrine as a subsidy to
215
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writers; the costs of original expression are lower because familiar background characters
and scenes can be borrowed without worry from preexisting sources.
The second reason, however, is evidence. If authors were allowed to copyright stock
characters and settings, courts would frequently find themselves facing the by-now
familiar evidentiary puzzle: upon seeing two works with similar expressive elements,
courts would find it difficult to determine whether there was impermissible copying of
those elements or whether, instead, any similarities innocently derive from the fact that in
both instances the overlapping details flow naturally from the setting at issue. Like the
merger doctrine, then, the doctrine of scènes à faire excludes these troubling cases from
the copyright regime.
C. Registration
Sections 408 through 412 of the Copyright Act combine to offer authors the option
of registering their works with the Copyright Office.218 Registration involves the payment
of a modest fee, the deposit of usually two copies of the work, and the submission of an
application that reveals some basic information about the work such as the name of its
author and the date on which it was completed.219 Registration is not an evaluative
process. While the Register of Copyright can deny registration in instances where the
Register believes the work is ineligible for protection,220 in general the Register just
archives copyright applications and defers to the courts any serious evaluation of
copyright claims.
For authors, there are two primary benefits to registration. First, an author who
registers his work within five years of its first publication enjoys certain evidentiary
presumptions as to the validity of his copyright and the accuracy of the information
supplied on his application.221 This makes it easier for the author to win any later
infringement action. Second, registration qualifies an author to pursue additional
remedies with respect to infringements that take place after registration.222 For example,
an author who has registered his work has the option of pursuing statutory damages
instead of actual damages, and such an author can also recover attorney’s fees.223 These
expanded remedies are particularly valuable in cases where actual damages would be
difficult to prove with sufficient specificity.224
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There are a number of possible explanations for the registration procedure. For
example, I pointed out earlier that copyright law might want to distinguish authors whose
expressive activities are motivated by copyright from authors for whom copyright was an
afterthought.225 Drawing this sort of distinction is desirable because, while copyright is
likely worth its costs in instances where it encourages expressive production, copyright
might not be worthwhile in cases where the promise of protection does not increase the
incentive to create. Registration partially accomplishes this goal by offering expanded
remedies to authors who signal, through registration, that copyright is important to them.
Registration is not an extreme approach in that even unregistered works are protected, but
registration does distinguish between the two categories of authors and thus it furthers the
goal of calibrating the level of protection to the likely incentive effect.
Another virtue of registration is that it increases the nation’s cultural archive. By
offering various advantages to registration, modern law encourages authors to submit
copies of their works to the Copyright Office. From there, many of these works are
passed along to the Library of Congress and, in turn, made available to the public. True,
registration could accomplish this even more effectively by requiring that all works be
registered; but, as was noted earlier, modern copyright law is reluctant to impose strict
requirements for fear that they will trip up foreign authors and authors who are not well
versed in the nuances of the law. Most of copyright law is thus implemented through
carrots, not sticks, and on this view registration is consistent with the overall approach of
the law.
Registration can also be at least in part explained by reference to evidentiary issues.
The presumptions that take hold if a work is registered within five years of its first
publication make it easier for the relevant copyright holders to litigate their cases. Cases
where the work was not registered within five years of publication, conversely, are much
harder to win. The presumptions thus have the effect of discouraging litigation in cases
where there is not good evidence—namely, cases where either (a) no copy of the work
was deposited or (b) a copy was deposited but only after a long time had passed since the
work was first made public. Note that, unlike all of the previous copyright doctrines
considered, registration does not exclude cases that lack good evidence. Instead,
registration simply sets the evidentiary burdens so as to discourage litigation in these
instances.
Some courts and commentators have argued that registration does not serve an
evidentiary purpose because the Copyright Office is not obligated to preserve copies of
all registered works.226 Section 704(d) explicitly states that copies of published works
need only be maintained for “the longest period considered practicable and desirable by
the Register of Copyrights and the Librarian of Congress,”227 and in 1983 the Copyright
Office announced that, due to a lack of storage space, published works would typically be
discarded after five years.228 These limitations do admittedly lessen the evidentiary value
of the registration procedure, but that effect should not be overstated. First, an archive for
225
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published works is only so important because, by definition, copies of published works
are widely available and thus there is naturally good evidence available with respect to
their contents. Second, none of the above-quoted text refers to unpublished works. For
these works, the evidentiary value of registration is greater, and the statute
correspondingly requires that copies of unpublished works not be “knowingly or
intentionally destroyed” during the copyright term unless a duplicate copy is archived.229
IV. Conclusion
This Article set out to explore an evidentiary perspective on copyright law and, more
specifically, to argue that copyright’s threshold inquiries into originality and fixation
serve important evidentiary goals. The main implications are two: first, that copyright
needlessly denies protection to databases and other factual material; and, second, that the
modern fixation requirement should either be taken more seriously or completely
discarded.
This Article has a secondary purpose, however, and that is to expose a problem of
increasing import to federal copyright law: copyright doctrines today each serve so many
different functions that they have become almost uselessly imprecise. That is, while
doctrines like originality, fixation, and merger might once have been valuable shorthands
for particular policy arguments, to invoke one of these doctrines today communicates
almost no information. Originality, for example, is sometimes about the costs of
expression, sometimes about the value of expression, sometimes about the importance of
public access, and, yes, sometimes about evidence. Courts almost never make clear which
issue is at play.
The quality of copyright decisions could be dramatically improved if courts were to
take serious interest in articulating the logical justifications for the copyright doctrines
they invoke. For instance, if merger is going to serve as the shorthand for several
different policy rationales, that might be fine, but courts invoking merger should in that
case further specify which specific set of issues and arguments they mean to call to mind.
Alternatively, a doctrine like merger could be matured to match up with only one policy
rationale, leaving separate doctrines to be associated with whatever policy arguments
remain.
The imprecision of the current approach is hard to defend and indeed dangerous to
the functioning of the law. This ambiguity contributed to the transformation of the
originality requirement from a potentially valuable proxy for rational policy goals to a
meaningless hunt for creativity itself. It similarly has undermined fixation. That
requirement is today associated with over a half dozen rationales; lost in an identity
crisis, it serves none of them well. In short, doctrines that accrue multiple meanings in
time can end up with no meaning at all. This is the warning implicit in the story of the
creativity and fixation requirements, and it is the secondary theme of this Article.
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